Openclaw cli: OpenClaw has stored XSS in exported session HTML viewer via markdown/raw-HTML rendering

The OpenClaw CLI exported session HTML viewer allowed stored XSS due to rendering markdown with marked.parse(...) and inserting HTML via innerHTML without overriding the html renderer token path. This permitted raw HTML, including malicious scripts (e.g., <img src=x onerror=...>), to be passed through unescaped. Additionally, tree and header metadata fields were interpolated without escaping in the export template. Opening a crafted exported HTML session file could execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the viewer context, exposing session content and enabling phishing or UI spoofing. The issue was fixed by overriding the marked html(token) renderer to escape raw HTML tokens, escaping metadata fields, adding image MIME sanitization, and regression tests. The fix was released in version 2026.2.23.

An attacker can craft a session with malicious HTML content that, when exported and opened in the OpenClaw HTML viewer, executes arbitrary JavaScript. This can lead to exposure of session data and enable phishing or UI spoofing attacks within the trusted export view. There is no indication of privilege escalation or remote code execution beyond the viewer context.

A patch is available in OpenClaw CLI version 2026.2.23 and later. Users should upgrade to this version or newer to remediate the stored XSS vulnerability. The fix includes escaping raw HTML tokens and metadata fields in the exported HTML and adding image MIME sanitization. No additional mitigation actions are required beyond applying the official fix.