Openclaw cli: OpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup env and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell paths

The vulnerability in OpenClaw CLI affects the shell-env fallback startup process where environment variables like SHELL, HOME, and ZDOTDIR were trusted and used to execute login shell commands. Specifically, the code executed `${SHELL} -l -c "env -0"` with inherited runtime environment, allowing attacker-influenced environment variables to trigger unintended command execution. The fix involves blocking these variables during config environment ingestion, sanitizing the shell fallback environment by pinning HOME to the real user home and dropping ZDOTDIR and other dangerous startup variables, and adding regression tests. This vulnerability allows local code execution under conditions where attacker-controlled environment or config input reaches the shell-env fallback, but it is not a public remote vulnerability.

The impact is a local code execution risk in environments where an attacker can influence environment or configuration inputs that reach the shell-env fallback in OpenClaw CLI. This could lead to execution of arbitrary commands in the context of the OpenClaw host process. The vulnerability requires local access and crossing of trusted operator boundaries, so it is not exploitable remotely. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts are rated low to medium given the local and privilege requirements.

A fix is available and planned for release in OpenClaw CLI version 2026.2.22. The fix hardens environment variable handling by blocking SHELL, HOME, and ZDOTDIR during configuration environment ingestion and sanitizes the shell fallback execution environment. Users should upgrade to version 2026.2.22 or later once released. Until then, avoid running OpenClaw CLI in environments where untrusted users can influence environment or configuration inputs that affect shell fallback execution. No additional mitigations are indicated by the vendor advisory.