CVE-2026-55252: OpenRun · Redirect URL validation bypass using //host paths leads to Open Redirect
Affects github.com/openrundev/openrunSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.1 Medium : upgrade to 0.17.7 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.17.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 1 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
CISA SSVC: proof of concept public
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
Timeline
CVE ID reserved
by GitHub, Inc.
, 107 days before disclosure
CVE published
on cve.org
, t = 0
CISA SSVC assessment
proof of concept public
, 10 minutes after disclosure
In Threat Radar
record ingested
, 25 days after disclosure
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA SSVC, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade github.com/openrundev/openrun to 0.17.7.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Gogithub.com/openrundev/openrun | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary The restrictions on redirect URLs in `openrun` can be bypassed by attackers, leading to open redirect attacks. ### Details In the current project, the referrer header value is used for subsequent redirects, so there is currently a validation for this redirect value. The current validation logic requires that the host and schema of the redirect URL be the same as the current website's URL, and finally, the path part is used for redirection. This check seems robust, but it can still be bypassed by attackers. <img width="1606" height="1346" alt="QQ20260602-140205-2-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83c549f3-38d7-444d-90f0-131d806f67ff" /> Here's the problem: Assuming the current website is `http://127.0.0.1:25222/`, if the attacker passes in a redirect URL of `http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com`, its host and schema are obviously the same as the current website, thus bypassing the verification. However, the issue lies in the final redirect URL, which is the path part of the URL, i.e., `//fushuling.com`. Browsers automatically complete the HTTP header for URLs starting with `//`, ultimately successfully bypassing the restriction and redirecting to the external address `http://fushuling.com`. This vulnerable behavior was successfully reproduced locally. Normally, specifying an external address directly will be blocked, so it will not redirect. <img width="1587" height="717" alt="QQ20260602-140756-2-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51430c42-bd10-401b-9c9f-27a91a0bc648" /> However, if the redirect URL is `http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com`, the existing validation logic is bypassed, and the Location header is successfully set to `//fushuling.com`. ``` POST /redirecttest/abc/frag HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:25222 Referer: http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com Cache-Control: max-age=0 sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="122" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.6261.57 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Sec-Fetch-Site: none Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Connection: close Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 0 ``` <img width="1536" height="729" alt="QQ20260602-140925-2-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31fde919-5f90-409f-8b14-af6c9c71761b" /> The user was then successfully redirected to the external address `http://fushuling.com`. <img width="1692" height="855" alt="QQ20260602-141005-2-5" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83b43ef6-52fa-4218-908b-7795394ae707" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com ``` ### Impact Open Redirect
References
- github.com/openrundev/openrun/security/advisories/GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openrundev/openrun/commit/709da784fcf1311c85f30f3542cfa3601a78bbf0 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openrundev/openrun (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openrundev/openrun/releases/tag/v0.17.7 (opens in a new tab)