CVE-2026-42810: Org.apache.polaris:polaris core: Apache Polaris has an Improper Input Validation Issue
Affects org.apache.polaris:polaris-coreSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.4 Critical : upgrade to 1.4.1 as a priority.
Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.4.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 4 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade org.apache.polaris:polaris-core to 1.4.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Mavenorg.apache.polaris:polaris-core | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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Description
Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions. In S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations. The confirmed behavior includes: - reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]); - listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]); - and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating and deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix. A control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access. A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the attacker could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`. In Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table version to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful confidentiality problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited to disclosure.
References
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42810 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/apache/polaris/commit/da54eb15c2c42c59afedefacbe7a528856b07c0a (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/apache/polaris (opens in a new tab)
- lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9 (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11 (opens in a new tab)