The research tested NVIDIA OpenShell v0.1.2's policy-enforced egress controls in AI agent sandboxes using 123 pre-registered trials on an Apple Silicon Mac with the microVM driver. The default policy successfully blocked a malicious canary leak in all attempts. No bypass of documented controls was found. However, egress occurred through operator-enabled paths including read-write rules, GET-only query/header values, audit-mode rules, and auto-approval that allowed new public hosts in all relevant trials. The prover component flags some protocols as unsupported, but the loader accepts them. The study provides detailed logs and test harnesses for reproducibility. No cloud environment or third-party services were involved.

No security bypass of documented egress controls was identified in NVIDIA OpenShell v0.1.2 under the tested conditions. Some egress occurred via operator-enabled paths, which are not considered bypasses but represent policy limitations. There is no evidence of active exploitation or critical security failures. The findings indicate that the sandbox's default policy effectively prevents malicious egress attempts tested in this study.

No official patch or remediation is indicated. The evaluation found no bypass of documented controls, and the observed egress through operator-enabled paths is a known limitation rather than a vulnerability. Users should review and carefully configure operator-opened rules such as read-write permissions, audit-mode settings, and auto-approval policies to minimize unintended egress. Refer to the detailed report and logs at https://sorami.com.au/research/nvidia-openshell-agent-sandbox-test/ for guidance.