CVE-2026-49820: go.probo.inc/probo · Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization
Affects go.probo.inc/proboSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.7 Medium : upgrade to 0.204.0 when convenient.
Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 19:04 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.204.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade go.probo.inc/probo to 0.204.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Gogo.probo.inc/probo | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Impact Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). The validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like `/../\evil.com` passed validation because the second character is `.`. Go's `http.Redirect` normalizes this path to `/\evil.com` before setting the `Location` header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (`https://evil.com`), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a `continue` parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere. ### Patches Fixed in `go.probo.inc/probo` by normalizing relative paths with `path.Clean` before validation, rejecting backslashes (including percent-encoded `%5c`) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes. Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to **probod v0.194.1** or later. SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched. ### Workarounds No practical workaround for self-hosted installations. Upgrade to the patched release.