Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-63634: pympp allows excessive sponsored transaction fees through padded calldata

Affects pymppSource GCVE Database

0
Compare
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-63634· Medium 6.9

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 0.9.1 when convenient.

Data as of 17 Nov 2026, 20:49 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 4.06.9
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.9.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 9 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade pympp to 0.9.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
PyPIpymppAffected
  • <0.9.1
Fixed in
  • 0.9.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Details When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet. **Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`. **Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit. ### PoC The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run: ```bash unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip cd pympp_python docker build -t pympp-padding . docker run --rm pympp-padding ``` There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md` ### Impact In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal transaction fee. This dramatically increases operational costs and completely destroys the profit margin on low-cost items. Please provide a way to share the PoC in .zip format to you. Thank you!

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…