CVE-2026-63634: pympp allows excessive sponsored transaction fees through padded calldata
Affects pymppSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 0.9.1 when convenient.
Data as of 17 Nov 2026, 20:49 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 4.0 | 6.9 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.9.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade pympp to 0.9.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PyPIpympp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Details When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet. **Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`. **Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit. ### PoC The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run: ```bash unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip cd pympp_python docker build -t pympp-padding . docker run --rm pympp-padding ``` There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md` ### Impact In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal transaction fee. This dramatically increases operational costs and completely destroys the profit margin on low-cost items. Please provide a way to share the PoC in .zip format to you. Thank you!
References
- github.com/tempoxyz/pympp/security/advisories/GHSA-v858-xh7w-8jr5 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63634 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tempoxyz/pympp/commit/57a750d0d980b8e6c3bea62a40b7621f176ff1f0 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tempoxyz/pympp (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tempoxyz/pympp/releases/tag/v0.9.1 (opens in a new tab)