The Miasma supply chain attack compromised 32 npm packages in the @redhat-cloud-services namespace by leveraging a compromised Red Hat employee GitHub account. Attackers abused GitHub Actions OIDC to publish malicious packages with valid SLSA attestations, effectively bypassing supply chain verification mechanisms. This indicates that the trust boundary for SLSA was circumvented upstream in the build pipeline. Additionally, the attack includes new identity collectors targeting GCP and Azure cloud environments, representing an escalation from credential harvesting to active cloud resource enumeration. The campaign's attribution is unclear, possibly linked to the TeamPCP toolkit released publicly in May 2026. The attack raises concerns about the adequacy of current OIDC trust models in npm publishing workflows.

The attack allowed malicious code to be published in trusted npm packages with valid supply chain attestations, potentially leading to widespread downstream compromise of software depending on these packages. The inclusion of new cloud identity collectors targeting GCP and Azure increases the risk of unauthorized cloud resource enumeration and potential further compromise. However, no known exploits in the wild have been reported at this time.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Organizations should review their supply chain security practices, especially around GitHub Actions OIDC workflows and the trust boundaries of SLSA attestations. Restricting OIDC token usage to specific branches or workflows may reduce risk but may not fully prevent abuse if developer accounts are compromised. Monitoring for unusual GitHub activity and package publishing is recommended. Follow updates from Red Hat and npm regarding official fixes or mitigations.