VulnerabilityPublished 13 Aug 2026Updated 29 Oct 2026

CVE-2025-68158: Safety · Authlib has 1-click Account Takeover vulnerability

Affects safetySource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.7 Medium : upgrade to 3.7.0_2 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

5.7Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 3.7.0_2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: Required
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: Required: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade safety to 3.7.0_2.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewsafety`pkg:brew/safety`Other threats	Affected >=3.2.4 <3.7.0_2	Fixed in 3.7.0_2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

# Security Advisory: Cache-Backed State Storage CSRF in Authlib The Security Labs team at Snyk has reported a security issue affecting Authlib, identified during a recent research project. The Snyk Security Labs team has identified a vulnerability that can result in a one-click account takeover in applications that utilize the Authlib library. ## Description Cache-backed state/request-token storage is not tied to the initiating user session, making CSRF possible for any attacker that possesses a valid state value (easily obtainable via an attacker-initiated authentication flow). When a cache is supplied to the OAuth client registry, `FrameworkIntegration.set_state_data` writes the entire state blob under `_state_{app}_{state}`, and `get_state_data` disregards the caller's session entirely. [1][2] ```py def _get_cache_data(self, key): value = self.cache.get(key) if not value: return None try: return json.loads(value) except (TypeError, ValueError): return None [snip] def get_state_data(self, session, state): key = f"_state_{self.name}_{state}" if self.cache: value = self._get_cache_data(key) else: value = session.get(key) if value: return value.get("data") return None ``` *authlib/integrations/base_client/framework_integration.py:12-41* Retrieval in `authorize_access_token` therefore succeeds for whichever browser presents that opaque value, and the token exchange proceeds with the attacker's authorization code. [3] ```py def authorize_access_token(self, **kwargs): """Fetch access token in one step. :return: A token dict. """ params = request.args.to_dict(flat=True) state = params.get("oauth_token") if not state: raise OAuthError(description='Missing "oauth_token" parameter') data = self.framework.get_state_data(session, state) if not data: raise OAuthError(description='Missing "request_token" in temporary data') params["request_token"] = data["request_token"] params.update(kwargs) self.framework.clear_state_data(session, state) token = self.fetch_access_token(**params) self.token = token return token ``` *authlib/integrations/flask_client/apps.py:57-76* This opens up an avenue for Login CSRF in applications that use cache-backed storage. Depending on the dependent application's implementation (e.g., whether it links accounts in the event of a login CSRF), this could lead to account takeover. ## Proof of Concept Consider a hypothetical application — AwesomeAuthlibApp. Assume that AwesomeAuthlibApp contains internal logic such that, when an already authenticated user performs a `callback` request, the application links the newly provided SSO identity to the existing user account associated with that request. Under these conditions, an attacker can achieve account takeover within the application by performing the following actions: 1. The attacker initiates an SSO OAuth flow but halts the process immediately before the callback request is made to AwesomeAuthlibApp. 2. The attacker then induces a logged-in user (via phishing, a drive-by attack, or similar means) to perform a GET request containing the attacker's state value and authorization code to the AwesomeAuthlibApp callback endpoint. Because Authlib does not verify whether the state token is bound to the session performing the callback, the callback is processed, the authorization code is sent to the provider, and the account linking proceeds. Once the GET request is executed, the attacker's SSO account becomes permanently linked to the victim's AwesomeAuthlibApp account. ## Suggested Fix Per the OAuth RFC [4], the state parameter should be tied to the user's session to prevent exactly such scenarios. One straightforward method of mitigating this issue is to continue storing the state in the session even when caching is enabled. An alternative approach would be to hash the session ID (or another per-user secret derived from the session) into the cache key. This ensures the state remains stored in the cache while still being bound to the session of the user that initiated the OAuth flow. ## Resources - [1] [flask_client/apps.py#L35](https://github.com/authlib/authlib/blob/260d04edee23d8470057ea659c16fb8a2c7b0dc2/authlib/integrations/flask_client/apps.py#L35) - [2] [base_client/framework_integration.py#L33](https://github.com/authlib/authlib/blob/260d04edee23d8470057ea659c16fb8a2c7b0dc2/authlib/integrations/base_client/framework_integration.py#L33) - [3] [flask_client/apps.py#L57](https://github.com/authlib/authlib/blob/260d04edee23d8470057ea659c16fb8a2c7b0dc2/authlib/integrations/flask_client/apps.py#L57) - [4] [RFC 6749 §10.12](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-10.12)

References

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