Scriban has an Infinite Recursion during Object Rendering Leads to Stack Overflow and Process Crash (Denial of Service)
Affects scribanSource GCVE Database
CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 6.6.0 soon.
Data as of 7 Jul 2026, 12:28 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 6.6.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HWhat to do
Upgrade scriban and Scriban.Signed to 6.6.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| NuGetscriban | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| NuGetScriban.Signed | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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AI-suggested
The suggested remediation is to update the TemplateContext to set ObjectRecursionLimit to a safe default such as 20. This change prevents infinite recursion by throwing a catchable exception instead of crashing the process. If you cannot patch yet, avoid passing untrusted or user-controlled data structures with potential circular references to the Scriban renderer.
Description
When Scriban renders an object that contains a circular reference, it traverses the object's members infinitely. Because the `ObjectRecursionLimit` property defaults to unlimited, this behavior exhausts the thread's stack space, triggering an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` that immediately terminates the hosting process. When rendering objects (e.g., `{{ obj }}`), the Scriban rendering engine recursively inspects and formats the object's properties. To prevent infinite loops caused by deeply nested or circular data structures, `TemplateContext` contains an `ObjectRecursionLimit` property. However, this property currently defaults to `0` (unlimited). If the data context pushed into the template contains a circular reference, the renderer will recurse indefinitely. This is especially dangerous for web applications that map user-controlled payloads (like JSON) directly to rendering contexts, or for applications that pass ORM objects (like Entity Framework models, which frequently contain circular navigation properties) into the template. #### Proof of Concept (PoC) The following C# code demonstrates the vulnerability. Executing this will cause an immediate, fatal `StackOverflowException`, bypassing any standard error handling. ```csharp using Scriban; using Scriban.Runtime; var template = Template.Parse("{{ a }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); var a = new ScriptObject(); // Introduce a cycle a["self"] = a; context.PushGlobal(new ScriptObject { { "a", a } }); try { // This crashes the entire process immediately template.Render(context); } catch (Exception ex) { // This will never execute because StackOverflowException Console.WriteLine("Caught exception: " + ex.Message); } ``` #### Impact This vulnerability allows a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. If a malicious user can manipulate the data structure passed to the renderer to include a cyclic reference, or if the application passes a complex object graph to an untrusted template, the entire .NET hosting process will crash. #### Suggested Remediation Update `TemplateContext.cs` to set `ObjectRecursionLimit` to a safe default, such as `20`. ```csharp public int ObjectRecursionLimit { get; set; } = 20; ``` By implementing this default, circular references will gracefully result in a catchable `ScriptRuntimeException` rather than a fatal process crash.