SOGo before 5.12.13 contains an improper cryptographic signature verification vulnerability that allows remote attackers to replace a victim's contact S/MIME certificate by sending a spoofed multipart/signed message with a mismatched signature and an impersonated From address
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 5.12.13 soon.
Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 19:19 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (VulnCheck) | CVSS 4.0 | 7.1 |
|---|---|---|
| CNA (VulnCheck) | CVSS 3.1 | 6.5 |
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 5.12.13
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 12 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade sogo to 5.12.13.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Alintosogo | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubsogopkg:github/sogoOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
SOGo before 5.12.13 contains an improper cryptographic signature verification vulnerability that allows remote attackers to replace a victim's contact S/MIME certificate by sending a spoofed multipart/signed message with a mismatched signature and an impersonated From address. Attackers can deliver a crafted CMS signedData object containing their own self-signed certificate, which SOGo's UIxMailView stores on the contact card without validating signature authenticity or certificate identity, enabling subsequent encrypted communications to be decrypted with the attacker's private key.