VulnerabilityPublished 13 Aug 2026Updated 26 Oct 2026

CVE-2026-48818: Starlette · SSRF and NTLM credential theft via UNC paths in StaticFiles on Windows

Affects mcp-google-sheetsSource GCVE Database

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-48818· High 7.5

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 0.6.3_2 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.5High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 30% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 0.6.3_2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade mcp-google-sheets to 0.6.3_2.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewmcp-google-sheets`pkg:brew/mcp-google-sheets`Other threats	Affected >=0.5.1 <0.6.3_2	Fixed in 0.6.3_2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary When serving static files on Windows, `StaticFiles` resolves the requested path with [`os.path.realpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.realpath). If a UNC path (such as `\\attacker.com\share`) reaches the resolver, `realpath` causes the process to open a connection to the remote host over SMB (port 445). This is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) that leaks the service account's NTLMv2 credentials to the attacker-controlled host, which can then be cracked offline or relayed to other hosts. ### Details `StaticFiles.lookup_path()` joins the requested path onto the served directory and calls [`os.path.realpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.realpath) on the result before checking containment with [`os.path.commonpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.commonpath). On Windows, a UNC path is absolute, so [`os.path.join`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.join) discards the served directory and `realpath` resolves the bare UNC path, triggering the outbound SMB connection and NTLM authentication before the containment check rejects the path. The HTTP response is a benign 404, but the credential disclosure has already happened. POSIX systems are not affected. This only affects the default configuration (`follow_symlink=False`), which uses [`os.path.realpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.realpath). The `follow_symlink=True` branch uses [`os.path.abspath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.abspath), which performs no I/O. ### Impact Applications running on Windows that serve files with `StaticFiles` (directly, or via a framework built on Starlette such as FastAPI) in the default configuration are affected. `StaticFiles` is typically unauthenticated, so any client can trigger the SMB connection and leak the service account's NTLMv2 hash. A secondary impact is discovering internal hosts reachable over SMB by timing responses for valid versus invalid addresses. ### Mitigation Applications not running on Windows are not affected. On Windows, serving static files through a dedicated web server (such as nginx or IIS) instead of `StaticFiles` avoids the issue. Blocking outbound SMB (port 445) from the application host prevents the credential disclosure even if a UNC path is resolved.

References

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