Telegram & how unwanted people can adb your device (since 3 feb 2023)
A configuration in the Telegram Android app allows app data to be backed up via Android's backup system, potentially exposing sensitive tokens and settings. This backup capability, controlled by the android:allowBackup attribute, can be exploited via adb backup commands if the device is accessible. The exposed data includes authentication tokens and user preferences, which could allow an attacker to hijack sessions without needing email or SMS verification if two-factor authentication is not enabled. The app stores salted and hashed PINs, which could be brute-forced offline. This issue was observed in the app's manifest as of February 3, 2023, and relates to the use of Android's BackupAgentHelper mechanism.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Telegram Android app's manifest includes android:allowBackup="true", enabling Android's backup system to include the app's data in device backups. This data includes saved authentication tokens and user preferences managed by a BackupAgentHelper subclass. An attacker with physical or adb access to the device could extract these backups using adb backup or bmgr backupnow commands. Extracted tokens allow session hijacking on other devices without requiring email or SMS verification if two-factor authentication is not enabled. The app stores PINs as salted SHA-256 hashes, which could be brute-forced offline using the extracted data. The configuration was changed from true to false in 2014 but was modified again on February 3, 2023, to re-enable backups. This potentially exposes user data to unauthorized access via adb backup mechanisms.
Potential Impact
If an attacker gains adb or physical access to an affected device, they can extract Telegram app data backups containing authentication tokens and user preferences. This enables session hijacking without needing traditional login credentials or two-factor authentication, assuming 2FA is not enabled. Additionally, attackers can attempt offline brute-force attacks on the user's PIN using the extracted salted hashes. This compromises user account confidentiality and could lead to unauthorized access to Telegram chats and sessions.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Users should verify if their Telegram app version disables android:allowBackup or if an update addresses this issue. Enabling two-factor authentication on Telegram accounts mitigates session hijacking risk even if tokens are extracted. Avoid granting adb access to untrusted parties and consider disabling USB debugging when not in use. Monitor official Telegram channels for updates or patches addressing this backup exposure.
Telegram & how unwanted people can adb your device (since 3 feb 2023)
Description
A configuration in the Telegram Android app allows app data to be backed up via Android's backup system, potentially exposing sensitive tokens and settings. This backup capability, controlled by the android:allowBackup attribute, can be exploited via adb backup commands if the device is accessible. The exposed data includes authentication tokens and user preferences, which could allow an attacker to hijack sessions without needing email or SMS verification if two-factor authentication is not enabled. The app stores salted and hashed PINs, which could be brute-forced offline. This issue was observed in the app's manifest as of February 3, 2023, and relates to the use of Android's BackupAgentHelper mechanism.
Reddit Discussion
Hi folks!
Here's 4 feb 2014: https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blame/9aeb8be8938e6083376142a782166a15edf46743/TMessagesProj/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml#L58
Old days, probably default config.
Here's 28 feb 2014: https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blame/2628a581478f1a30197ed0fc37165b17a3c97c98/TMessagesProj/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml#L87
true -> false 24 days after. Guess to fix it.
Here is today https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blame/2628a581478f1a30197ed0fc37165b17a3c97c98/TMessagesProj/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml#L99-L101 - 3 feb 2023 it was modified.
What does this mean?
android:allowBackup="true" allows the app's data to be included in Android's backup system (cloud backup via Google and, under the right conditions via adb backup or bmgr backupnow), need fullBackupOnly afaik to work w/o agent.
Here is the agent:
BackupAgent extends BackupAgentHelper :
https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/b7561f0c641b521df0000bda2704664d792d6a1a/TMessagesProj/src/main/java/org/telegram/messenger/BackupAgent.java#L13-L14 (12.9.2 release - latest)
There are:
saved_tokens, saved_tokens_login, prefs
Here are your tokens, your settings (shared prefs).
So, via adb get tokens & settings (shared prefs)
- launch your session on another device w/o email/sms using tokens straight to chats if you don't have 2fa
- hashcat your pin (prefs contain salt & sha256 of salt'pin'salt) to get your pin and try it this device (if you "forgot it) or "elsewhere (pins and password must be unique per device/service!) https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/b7561f0c641b521df0000bda2704664d792d6a1a/TMessagesProj/src/main/java/org/telegram/messenger/SharedConfig.java#L849-L852 (12.9.2 release - latest)
Sure, they could dump your chats anyway or run your account anywhere cause it have a "central server". But enabling such "backups" for me it's kinda yelling "it's not us it's they/them/🐷".
Android backup refs:
- https://developer.android.com/identity/data/autobackup#EnablingAutoBackup
- https://developer.android.com/identity/data/autobackup#ImplementingBackupAgent
Folks you're welcome to comment 🍻
Links cited in this discussion
- https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blame/9aeb8be8938e6083376142a782166a15edf46743/TMessages…
- https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blame/2628a581478f1a30197ed0fc37165b17a3c97c98/TMessages…
- https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blame/2628a581478f1a30197ed0fc37165b17a3c97c98/TMessages…
- https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/b7561f0c641b521df0000bda2704664d792d6a1a/TMessagesP…
- https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/b7561f0c641b521df0000bda2704664d792d6a1a/TMessagesP…
- https://developer.android.com/identity/data/autobackup#EnablingAutoBackup
- https://developer.android.com/identity/data/autobackup#ImplementingBackupAgent
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The Telegram Android app's manifest includes android:allowBackup="true", enabling Android's backup system to include the app's data in device backups. This data includes saved authentication tokens and user preferences managed by a BackupAgentHelper subclass. An attacker with physical or adb access to the device could extract these backups using adb backup or bmgr backupnow commands. Extracted tokens allow session hijacking on other devices without requiring email or SMS verification if two-factor authentication is not enabled. The app stores PINs as salted SHA-256 hashes, which could be brute-forced offline using the extracted data. The configuration was changed from true to false in 2014 but was modified again on February 3, 2023, to re-enable backups. This potentially exposes user data to unauthorized access via adb backup mechanisms.
Potential Impact
If an attacker gains adb or physical access to an affected device, they can extract Telegram app data backups containing authentication tokens and user preferences. This enables session hijacking without needing traditional login credentials or two-factor authentication, assuming 2FA is not enabled. Additionally, attackers can attempt offline brute-force attacks on the user's PIN using the extracted salted hashes. This compromises user account confidentiality and could lead to unauthorized access to Telegram chats and sessions.
Defensive Guidance
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Users should verify if their Telegram app version disables android:allowBackup or if an update addresses this issue. Enabling two-factor authentication on Telegram accounts mitigates session hijacking risk even if tokens are extracted. Avoid granting adb access to untrusted parties and consider disabling USB debugging when not in use. Monitor official Telegram channels for updates or patches addressing this backup exposure.
Technical Details
- Source Type
- Subreddit
- cybersecurity
- Reddit Score
- 0
- Discussion Level
- minimal
- Content Source
- reddit_link_post
- Post Type
- link
- Domain
- null
- Newsworthiness Assessment
- {"score":27,"reasons":["external_link","established_author","very_recent"],"isNewsworthy":true,"foundNewsworthy":[],"foundNonNewsworthy":[]}
- Has External Source
- true
- Trusted Domain
- false
Threat ID: 6a7c77f4bf8831d5399f200d
Added to database: 08/12/2026, 13:41:08 UTC
Last enriched: 08/12/2026, 13:41:33 UTC
Last updated: 08/12/2026, 18:11:03 UTC
Views: 6
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