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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-104014: The Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to

Source GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-104014· Critical 9.8

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical.

Data as of 7 Nov 2026, 13:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.8Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (Wordfence)CVSS 3.19.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 7 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 7 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
naimurrahmannahidNaimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerceAffected
  • <=2.1.0
Fixed in–

Description

The Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 2.1.0. This is due to the plugin's password-reset finalization endpoint (the wp_ajax_nopriv_ceovw_update_new_password action handled by CEOVW_AJAX::update_new_password()) authorizing the reset solely by the presence of a database row marking an email as 'VERIFIED', with no timestamp check, no session binding, and no per-reset token — combined with mark_otp_as_verified_for_reset() leaving the row in that state after a user enters their code (abandoning the flow leaves the row behind), and a scheduled 'ceovw_cleanup_expired_otps_event' cron that has no add_action() handler anywhere in the plugin so cleanup never runs. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to take over any account whose owner previously requested and verified a password-reset code and did not immediately finish choosing a new password — the attacker needs only the victim's email address and a nonce that the plugin itself localizes publicly into the CEOVW_APP global on the WooCommerce account page for logged-out visitors, after which they call the endpoint, overwrite the victim's password, and are returned a live wordpress_logged_in_ session cookie for that user (full site takeover if the account is an administrator).

References

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