The PocketTouch and TouchPoint POS CHECKPAYMENT workflow accepts a caller-supplied clerk number without adequately
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical.
Data as of 17 Nov 2026, 20:04 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CISA-ADP | CVSS 3.1 | 9.1 |
|---|
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ICRTouchTouchPoint POS | Affected
| Fixed in– |
| ICRTouchPocketTouch | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is provided, restrict access to the POS protocol to trusted users only and monitor for unauthorized use of clerk identifiers.
Description
The PocketTouch and TouchPoint POS systems have a vulnerability in their CHECKPAYMENT workflow where the clerk number provided by the caller is not properly verified for authorization. This flaw allows an attacker with access to the POS protocol to impersonate another employee by specifying their clerk identifier and submitting payment requests under that identity.