Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-116578: Tornado · Open redirect in RedirectHandler via protocol-relative URLs

Affects nvcheckerSource GCVE Database

0
Compare
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-116578· Low 2.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 2.1 Low : upgrade to 2.22_3 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
2.1Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 4.02.1
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.22_3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade nvchecker to 2.22_3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Homebrewnvcheckerpkg:brew/nvcheckerOther threatsAffected
  • >=2.7 <2.22_3
Fixed in
  • 2.22_3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary `tornado.web.RedirectHandler` builds its target URL by substituting parts of the request path into a template. Depending on where those substitutions appear in the template, an attacker can craft a request that redirects to a host of their choosing. This creates an open redirect on the application's domain, which can be used in phishing. ### Impact Applications are affected if they use `RedirectHandler` with a URL template where a regex capture group can influence the scheme or host of the redirect. This includes: - **A substitution at the start of the path**, for example `(r"/(.*)/target", RedirectHandler, {"url": "/{0}/destination"})`. A request to `https://example.com//evil.com/target` redirects to `//evil.com/destination`, a protocol-relative URL pointing to evil.com. Variants using backslashes or encoded characters have the same effect, because browsers treat them as equivalent to `//`. - **A substitution directly after the host**, for example `(r"/old(.*)", RedirectHandler, {"url": "https://new.example.com{0}"})`. A request to `/old.evil.com/` or `/old@evil.com/` redirects to evil.com. - **A template that begins with a substitution** (such as `"{0}"`), which can be given an absolute URL. Applications are not affected if their `RedirectHandler` templates use only static URLs, or if every substitution comes after a fixed host and a `/` (for example `"/static/{0}"` or `"https://example.com/{0}"`). Other uses of `RequestHandler.redirect()` are not affected by this advisory, although applications that pass user-controlled input to `redirect()` should validate it themselves. ### Patches Fixed in Tornado 6.6. `RedirectHandler` now returns a 400 error if the substituted values would change the scheme or host of the redirect from what the template specifies. As a result, substitutions can no longer be used in the scheme or host part of a template. The similar check in `StaticFileHandler` has also been hardened against backslash and whitespace variants. ### Workarounds - Change `RedirectHandler` templates so every substitution comes after a fixed prefix ending in `/`, or write capture-group regexes that cannot match characters such as `/`, `\`, `@`, `.` or `:` where they could affect the host. - Alternatively, replace `RedirectHandler` with a custom handler that validates the target before calling `self.redirect()`. ### Credit Reported by Longwei Wang (@gn00295120).

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…