The threat campaign titled "Trickbot to Ryuk in Two Hours" describes a rapid attack chain leveraging the Trickbot malware to deploy Ryuk ransomware within a very short timeframe, approximately two hours. Trickbot is a modular banking Trojan that has evolved into a versatile malware platform used for credential theft, lateral movement, and network reconnaissance. In this campaign, Trickbot is used to gain initial access, perform extensive network and system discovery, credential dumping, and disable security tools to evade detection. The attack employs multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as scheduled tasks (T1053) for persistence, disabling security tools (T1089), group policy modification (T1484), process injection (T1055), and obfuscated files or information (T1027) to maintain stealth and control. The adversaries leverage valid accounts (T1078) and credential dumping (T1003) to escalate privileges and move laterally across the network. Discovery techniques include system network connections (T1049), software and security software discovery (T1518, T1063), remote system discovery (T1018), and network share discovery (T1135). Remote services (T1021), remote desktop protocol (T1076), and remote file copy (T1105) facilitate lateral movement and payload deployment. The final stage involves deploying Ryuk ransomware, which encrypts data for impact (T1486), causing significant operational disruption. The campaign is known to utilize tools like Cobalt Strike and PowerView for post-exploitation activities. The rapid progression from initial compromise to ransomware deployment underscores the high operational tempo and sophistication of the threat actors behind this campaign.

For European organizations, this threat poses a severe risk to operational continuity, data confidentiality, and integrity. The rapid deployment of Ryuk ransomware following Trickbot infection can lead to widespread encryption of critical data, resulting in significant downtime and potential financial losses due to ransom payments or recovery costs. The use of credential dumping and lateral movement techniques increases the likelihood of extensive network compromise, affecting multiple systems and business units. Disabling security tools and modifying group policies can hinder incident detection and response efforts, prolonging the attack's impact. Given the prevalence of Windows-based infrastructure in Europe and the reliance on networked services, organizations in sectors such as finance, healthcare, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure are particularly vulnerable. Additionally, the campaign's use of legitimate credentials and administrative shares complicates mitigation and forensic analysis, increasing the potential for long-term compromise and data exfiltration.

To mitigate this threat, European organizations should implement a multi-layered defense strategy tailored to the specific tactics used in this campaign. First, enforce strict credential hygiene by implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) across all remote access and administrative accounts to reduce the effectiveness of credential dumping and reuse. Regularly audit and restrict the use of privileged accounts and administrative shares to limit lateral movement opportunities. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting process injection, obfuscated code, and suspicious scheduled tasks. Monitor for unusual group policy modifications and disable unnecessary Windows management tools like PowerShell or restrict their usage through application control policies. Network segmentation should be enforced to contain infections and prevent rapid spread. Implement strict egress filtering and monitor network traffic for anomalies, especially connections to known command and control infrastructure associated with Trickbot and Ryuk. Regularly update and patch systems to close vulnerabilities that could be exploited for initial access or privilege escalation. Conduct frequent backups of critical data, ensuring backups are offline or immutable to prevent ransomware encryption. Finally, conduct regular threat hunting and incident response exercises focusing on the detection of Trickbot and Ryuk indicators and behaviors.