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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-83813: DNS Response Spoofing in twisted.names Due to Missing Source Address Validation

Affects scrapySource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-83813· Low 3.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.1 Low.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
3.1Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.13.1
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 1% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 23 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Homebrewscrapypkg:brew/scrapyOther threatsAffected
  • >=2.9.0
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Users should ensure that DNS queries are issued via twisted.names.client.Resolver, which mitigates the risk by using per-query random source ports. Avoid reusing DNSDatagramProtocol instances for multiple queries to prevent source port reuse. Monitor vendor advisories for any future patches addressing source address validation.

Description

A vulnerability in twisted.names.dns.DNSDatagramProtocol allows DNS response spoofing due to missing source address validation. The protocol accepts DNS responses based solely on matching transaction IDs without verifying the source address, enabling off-path attackers to inject forged DNS answers if they can send UDP packets with the correct transaction ID. The standard twisted.names.client.Resolver mitigates this risk by using per-query random source ports, increasing entropy, but the underlying missing source validation remains a security gap.

References

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