VU#492466: Logto Identity Platform has authentication and authorization failures in core protocol handling
Source CERT/CC
Mentioned vulnerabilities
Not known to be exploited.
Data as of 2 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC
Rated by Threat Radar · No CVSS score from NVD or the CNA
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 41% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Exploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
Public on cve.org; its publication date is not in this record
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2 Nov 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
could not be reached for coordination. Until a patch is released, administrators should reduce the attack surface by avoiding provisioning local accounts with emails used for federated sign-in, disabling or avoiding Logto's social SAML connector, requiring MFA at the upstream identity provider for all federated sign-ins, enforcing strict domain normalization at the IdP or provisioning layer, shortening session lifetimes, aggressively invalidating sessions, monitoring authentication logs for anomalies, and placing Logto behind an identity-aware reverse proxy.
Description
The Logto Identity Platform contains multiple vulnerabilities in its authentication and single sign-on (SSO) components that weaken core identity protections. These flaws allow attackers to bypass account-ownership checks, skip multi-factor authentication (MFA), replay federated sessions, and submit identity assertions without proper validation. The issues affect OIDC, OAuth 2.1, and SAML protocols and create several paths for unauthorized access in both local and federated sign-in flows. No vendor patch or statement is currently available, and mitigation relies on defensive configurations and operational controls.