Threat database

When the director sends a long-running request (e.g.compile_package), the agent's reply JSON is consumed by AgentClient.inject_compile_log (line 332-339) reads response['value']['result']['compile_log_id'] and format_exception (line 318-325) reads exception['blobstore_id']; both pass the agent-supplied string unmodified to download_and_delete_blob(blob_id) (line 344-349), which calls @resource_manager.get_resource(blob_id) and, in an ensure block, @resource_manager.delete_resource(blob_id). Api::ResourceManager forwards the id straight to blobstore.get(id) / blobstore.delete(id). When the director is configured with the local blobstore provider, Blobstore::LocalClient#object_file_path(oid) is File.join(@blobstore_path, oid) (local_client.rb:54-56) with no normalisation, so oid = "../../jobs/director/config/director.yml" resolves outside the blobstore root. Affected versions: BOSH Director: All versions prior to v282.1.12

Cloud Foundry UUA versions from v77.30.0 to v78.7.0 and CF Deployment versions from v48.7.0 to v54.14.0 are vulnerable to an authentication bypass. The vulnerability arises when SAML 2.

Cloud Foundry routing release versions from v0.163.0 to v0.283.0 are vulnerable to a DOS attack. An unauthenticated attacker can use this vulnerability to force route pruning and therefore degrade the service availability of the Cloud Foundry deployment.