---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (250820d93fb4af5623deeafca1bf574b6331f836f2fa953ba1eb8dba40eab28e)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/xgemwahfoo/MAL-2026-9524.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (a7ec134b021ea6d577c578e824f775afc5d5ae2448164f701cf7f5724438ad38)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wye4ce4244/MAL-2026-9515.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (3683d010f4856bfb71dc5e63c6caed54bb9b8eef34fbf324768d11ab1041990e)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wybc6423a5/MAL-2026-9513.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (691fdfcd64c13b4ba681f12345083f24b3aa27c455cb2afa6ed730525e265a09)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wyb00f8cef/MAL-2026-9512.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (b4963b739545285527c5501e8190194c3c36f081e7e79a5c24547588fa88aea6)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wtenc4/MAL-2026-9488.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (a4355299afb80d8c49c33fb8df1364811550f40afc5011249317d3fe25b7dcd5)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wptask/MAL-2026-9481.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (63d360d82f18668be06d6d6a9c1749cb2dab0240c615ea2db5a4e2e1f2a817e1)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wprwn6accxyz/MAL-2026-9479.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (37c7d64c0299f796482497842b695209ef2d079aeb54428d0f7879904216e37a)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wprwn6xyz/MAL-2026-9480.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (6ab69aaf0e3f93db0cd1c0f1775b9243a92fc8d639b43e6c443f7970dadcb191)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wandjinamod36977/MAL-2026-9230.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (249d9bd30b8d44f90c3d500c950018dcd18f7c9cea74af52b8e1fcb092f4bcf9)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wandhr8/MAL-2026-9228.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (e764e09b4f1147970a87624e0e1d9214848519dc6f75fa7daaf6460fdb0e3bcd)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wandhr6/MAL-2026-9226.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (ba7691ccc6f411650375038de5aa4aa937edce1d82edd0bba460ee24bef1d0cb)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wandhr7/MAL-2026-9227.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (f29523caa65c5a35a9f590dc45ad7a80bb15892fddfb19eefa0767e2da330470)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wandhr4/MAL-2026-9224.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (bc33077471b33255528b0d8633748874bb320fd9853e6119bbc76ee248eeab6e)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/chmid8000x530358/MAL-2026-7586.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (91a0b57f894240f6b4ae1941e4a87030caeaeb5f52e564ded406e49c78383e60)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/chmid8000x584612/MAL-2026-7587.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (28fd3badbe08ac1b3173f34f5a9559e2431c652dc01f9f55612c51c8c1de6303)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/chmid6000x524101/MAL-2026-7579.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (10d349f14eff5b46424bbbb723a5a52afe4b6c97c7048410536fcfa09f715198)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/chatoaitestsvn1778552651/MAL-2026-7575.json))
### Summary
Coder's subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL's username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname.
> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker's crafted app URL while authenticated.
### Impact
An authenticated user could craft a subdomain encoding their own workspace UUID and a victim's username. If the victim visited the attacker's URL, the attacker's JavaScript could issue credentialed cross-origin `fetch()` requests to the victim's workspace apps and read the responses, exfiltrating data accessible through those apps.
### Patches
The fix validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace's actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity.
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |
### Workarounds
None.
### Resources
- Fix: #26086, #26085
### Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22434) for independently disclosing this issue!
### Summary
The `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters.
> **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.
### Impact
A user who could run a workspace could emit arbitrary HTML into agent logs; when another user, including an administrator, viewed the workspace page, it rendered in their session. Content Security Policy blocked inline scripts but an attacker could still inject a `meta refresh` redirect, `style` rules for UI redressing or CSS-based exfiltration or external `img` beacons. This required workspace-owner access and a victim viewing the page.
### Patches
The fix enables `escapeXML: true` so HTML metacharacters are escaped before DOM insertion.
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |
### Workarounds
None.
### Resources
- Fix: #25808
### Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22449) for independently disclosing this issue!
### Summary
The AI Bridge Proxy (`aibridgeproxyd`) created a goproxy server whose default transport set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and only assigned a secure transport when an upstream proxy was configured. In the default configuration (no upstream proxy), outbound HTTPS to the Coder access URL accepted any TLS certificate.
> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires an on-path (man-in-the-middle) position between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server. Deployments where they are co-located over loopback are effectively unaffected.
### Impact
An attacker positioned between the proxy and the Coder server, via ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning or control of proxy environment variables, could intercept injected Coder session tokens, user-supplied provider API keys (BYOK) and full request and response bodies including prompts and completions. The default transport also honored `HTTP_PROXY` and `HTTPS_PROXY`, allowing environment-based traffic redirection.
### Patches
The fix applies the secure transport (TLS 1.2 or higher using system root CAs) unconditionally. The AI Bridge Proxy was introduced in v2.30.0. Earlier release lines including the v2.29 ESR line are not affected.
The fix is available in the following releases:
| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
### Workarounds
Ensure the Coder access URL uses a trusted certificate and secure the network path between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server (for example, loopback or mTLS).
### Resources
- Fix: #26131
### Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22455) for independently disclosing this issue!