Google Warns: Critical Chrome Flaw Letting Hackers Take Over PCs Is Already Being Exploited
Source: https://techoreon.com/google-warns-critical-chrome-flaw-letting-hackers-take-over-pcs-is-already-being-exploited/
Sharing a project I’ve been building called **T3E** .
It converts *any file* into a `.wav` audio file using:
* Deterministic frequency encoding
* Signal obfuscation
* Key-based frequency shifting
**T3E was built to challenge traditional encryption assumptions** — especially in response to:
* Quantum computing
* AI-based reverse engineering
* Memory forensics & low-level analysis
I have a `.wav` file that contains a fully encrypted Excel spreadsheet.
It plays as normal audio — but is **reversible only** with the correct key and decoder.
# Key Properties:
* No ciphertext or headers (not AES, not base64)
* Audio plays clean, but stores real data
* AI/quantum-resistant — no repeating patterns
* Even with the same key, each encryption produces a unique `.wav`
* Decryption requires the **exact** `.wav` **file** \+ key
* Optional memory-free decryption (executes in RAM only)
Not selling anything — just posting to gather early feedback from serious folks in netsec, RE, and crypto.
Appreciate any critiques on:
* Security model
* Weaknesses or edge cases
* Post-quantum viability
Try breaking it — I’d love to see how it holds up.
Abusing Chrome Remote Desktop on Red Team Operations
Source: https://trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-chrome-remote-desktop-on-red-team-operations-a-practical-guide
How we got persistent XSS on every AEM cloud site, thrice
Source: https://slcyber.io/assetnote-security-research-center/how-we-got-persistent-xss-on-every-aem-cloud-site-thrice/
CVE-2025-47812 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Wing FTP Server disclosed in June 2025. It allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code, which could lead to full system compromise. No official patch or detailed affected versions have been released yet, and no exploits have been observed in the wild. The vulnerability is considered high risk due to the ease of exploitation without authentication. Current mitigations focus on heightened monitoring, network segmentation, and restricting access to the FTP server until a patch is available. Organizations using Wing FTP Server, especially in Europe, face elevated risk. Defenders should prioritize anomaly detection on FTP traffic and prepare for rapid patch deployment once released.
**Disclosure**: I work at CyberArk
The research shows that Chrome’s AppBound cookie encryption relies on a key derivation process with limited entropy and predictable inputs. By systematically generating possible keys based on known parameters, an attacker can brute-force the correct encryption key without any elevated privileges or code execution. Once recovered, this key can decrypt any AppBound-protected cookies, completely undermining the isolation AppBound was intended to provide in enterprise environments.
We broke Chrome’s AppBound cookie encryption used in enterprise environments. Using timing-based attacks against the WebView lifecycle, we were able to recover encryption keys and decrypt secure cookies — no root or sandbox escape required. This affects managed Android profiles using MDM and AppBound mode.
When Backups Open Backdoors: Accessing Sensitive Cloud Data via "Synology Active Backup for Microsoft 365"
Source: https://modzero.com/en/blog/when-backups-open-backdoors-synology-active-backup-m365/
|Reference: [Ongoing Campaign Abuses Microsoft 365’s Direct Send to Deliver Phishing Emails](https://www.varonis.com/blog/direct-send-exploit)|
|:-|
**Key Points:**
* **Phishing Campaign:** Varonis' MDDR Forensics team uncovered a phishing campaign exploiting Microsoft 365's Direct Send feature.
* **Direct Send Feature:** Allows internal devices to send emails without authentication, which attackers abuse to spoof internal users.
* **Detection:** Look for external IPs in message headers, failures in SPF, DKIM, or DMARC, and unusual email behaviors.
* **Prevention:** Enable "Reject Direct Send," implement strict DMARC policies, and educate users on risks.
For technical details, please see more in reference (above).
Could anyone share samples or real-world experiences about this *(for education and security monitoring)*?
When Your Login Page Becomes the Frontline: Lessons from a Real-World DDoS Attack
Source: https://www.cloud-iam.com/post/our-resilience-against-cyber-attacks
Scanning Beyond the Patch: A Public-Interest Hunt for Hidden Shells
Source: https://disclosing.observer/2025/06/14/patching-is-not-enough-persistent-backdoors-after-the-fix.html
Marketplace Takeover: How We Could’ve Taken Over Every Developer Using a VSCode Fork - Putting Millions at Risk
Source: https://blog.koi.security/marketplace-takeover-how-we-couldve-taken-over-every-developer-using-a-vscode-fork-f0f8cf104d44
As red teamers, we often explore how attackers manipulate system components to achieve persistence, evade detection, or alter behavior. The Windows Registry, a critical configuration database, is a prime target for such operations. In this article, I’ll share a C++ program that demonstrates registry manipulation, explain its mechanics, and discuss its implications in offensive security all while emphasizing ethical use in authorized penetration testing. Whether you’re a red teamer, blue teamer,
Deleting a file in Wire doesn’t remove it from servers — and other findings
Source: https://offsec.almond.consulting/deleting-file-wire-doesnt-remove-it.html
