Search: demand.io
116 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.7 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.7EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-74483 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: don't leak the user namespace when the mount fails bm_get_tree() takes a reference to the user namespace and hands it to get_tree_keyed() as the sget key. sget_fc() moves that reference into sb->s_fs_info and clears fc->s_fs_info, so from that point on the superblock owns it and bm_free() doesn't see it anymore. The superblock drops it in ->put_super(). But generic_shutdown_super() only calls ->put_super() from inside the if (sb->s_root) branch, so nothing releases it when bm_fill_super() fails: - The kzalloc_obj() failure leaves s_root NULL and the whole branch is skipped. - A simple_fill_super() failure in the file loop leaves s_root set, but s_op still points at simple_super_operations, which has no ->put_super(). bm_fill_super() installs s_ops only once simple_fill_super() returned success, and installing it earlier wouldn't help either because simple_fill_super() overwrites s_op. Either way vfs_get_super() calls deactivate_locked_super() and the reference is gone for good. binfmt_misc mounts are available in a user namespace and both the inode and the dentry cache are SLAB_ACCOUNT, so an unprivileged caller under a tight memory cgroup can fail simple_fill_super() on demand and leak one user namespace per attempt. Drop the reference in ->kill_sb() instead, which runs unconditionally, the same way nfsd and rpc_pipefs release their keyed s_fs_info. That also stops ->put_super() from clearing s_fs_info while the superblock is still on @fs_supers. generic_shutdown_super() leaves it there on purpose so that sget_fc() keeps finding it until kill_sb() has run, but a NULL s_fs_info makes test_keyed_super() miss it, so a concurrent mount for the same user namespace skips the grab_super() wait and creates a second superblock for a namespace that is still being torn down. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | High7.5EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-74396 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's RDMA mlx5 driver caused a resource leak and potential deadlock due to improper cleanup of XLT buffers on On-Demand Paging (ODP) populate failure. This flaw was fixed by ensuring the error path falls through the existing cleanup routine. The issue affects multiple specific Linux kernel versions and has been addressed in fixed releases. EPSS 0.7%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-72813actix-files · Uncaught Exception Medium6.9EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72813 actix-files before 0.6.10 contains a denial of service vulnerability triggered by an empty Range header in GET requests for static files. When panic is set to abort, remote attackers can crash the process on-demand by sending a GET request with an empty Range header. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-73423withastro astro · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Medium5.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-73423 Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. From 7.0.0 until 7.0.6, the composable astro/hono pipeline installs security.checkOrigin only through the middleware() primitive, while actions() and pages() can dispatch to user code independently. Mounting actions() before middleware(), as in the examples/advanced-routing example and Cloudflare Hono documentation, allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the origin check, and using pages() without middleware() drops the check for on-demand endpoints and pages. The flaw enables blind write-only cross-site request forgery using the victim's cookies against ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback when manifest.checkOrigin is enabled; the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler but cannot read the cross-origin response. The default non-composable astro() pipeline is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.6. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-73422withastro astro · Cross-site Scripting Medium5.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-73422 Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. From 2.9.0 until 7.1.0, Astro's server-side View Transition CSS generator interpolates animation properties into an inline style element without escaping them for CSS and HTML contexts. An attacker-controlled View Transition animation value such as duration can terminate the generated style element and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript. The affected code is packages/astro/src/runtime/server/transition.ts; renderTransition passes sheet.toString() into markHTMLString(), while addAnimationProperty serializes duration through toTimeValue() and also handles easing, direction, delay, fillMode, and name. Exploitation requires an on-demand or server-rendered route to pass attacker-controlled data into a View Transition animation definition and can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the affected application's origin, allowing access to sensitive page data and authenticated actions available to the victim. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 3.7 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-11811zephyrproject zephyr · Dos Low3.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11811 The UpdateHub over-the-air update client's start_coap_client() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c leaks the CoAP/DTLS socket descriptor on its connection-setup failure paths. The shared error: cleanup gated socket closing on a ret > 0 flag, but ret was set to -1 immediately after the socket was created, so when zsock_setsockopt() (DTLS) or zsock_connect() subsequently failed the gate was false and cleanup_connection() was never called. The open descriptor in the global ctx.sock was then overwritten by the next attempt, permanently leaking it from the socket / net_context pool until reboot. The failing setup path is reached every time the OTA client tries to contact the UpdateHub server and the connection cannot be established — driven automatically by the periodic autohandler() poll (and on demand via the updatehub_probe()/updatehub_update() API or the updatehub run shell command). The DTLS handshake/connect outcome is influenceable by a network or on-path attacker who drops, resets, or otherwise disrupts traffic to the server, and also fails naturally whenever the server is unreachable. Each failed attempt permanently leaks one descriptor; once the shared socket pool is exhausted, networking degrades device-wide until the device is rebooted, a denial-of-service condition. Severity is low because the leak rate is bounded by the configured OTA poll interval (default once per 24 hours), the effect is gradual and recovered by reboot, and only builds with the UpdateHub client enabled are affected. There is no memory-corruption, information-disclosure, or authentication impact. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog Security teams are being asked to defend a growing attack surface with fewer people and around the clock, against threat actors who never take a night off. As cyberattackers increasingly use AI to launch and scale campaigns, the volume, speed, and sophistication of threats continue to rise. Closing that gap takes more than tooling. It takes a partner that pairs a leading security platform with scaled intelligence and human experts who can act on your behalf at any hour. That’s exactly what Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is built to do. We are excited to announce that we have been named a Leader in the 2026 IDC MarketScape: Worldwide MDR/MXDR for the Enterprise Vendor Assessment (Doc #US54792426, July 2026). Read the excerpt here . Scale your SOC with Microsoft Defender Experts MDR Expert-led MDR, built on the Microsoft Defender platform Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is a round-the-clock, expert-led managed detection and response service that helps security teams triage, investigate, and respond to incidents so they can stop cyberattackers in their tracks and prevent future compromise. Rather than bolting a separate stack of tools and connectors onto your environment, the service operates natively on Microsoft Defender , with built-in protection across endpoints, identities, email, cloud apps, cloud workloads, and network security, as well as around-the-clock proactive threat hunting with Microsoft Defender Experts Hunting . Because the service is delivered on the same platform it monitors, detection and intelligence improvements reach customers continuously. The insights our experts generate also strengthen protection across the broader Defender ecosystem, so every customer benefits from what we learn defending the next environment. The IDC MarketScape vendor assessment model is designed to provide an overview of the competitive fitness of technology and service suppliers in a given market. The research uses a rigorous scoring methodology based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria that results in a single graphical illustration of each supplier’s position within a given market. The Capabilities axis measures supplier product, go-to-market, and business execution in the short term, while the Strategy axis measures how well a supplier’s strategy aligns with customer requirements over a 3-5-year timeframe. Supplier market share is represented by the size of the icons . Threat intelligence at internet scale Great detection starts with great intelligence. Defender Experts MDR draws on Microsoft’s global threat intelligence: more than 10,000 security researchers and 100 trillion signals analyzed every day across billions of users and millions of organizations. 1 That breadth lets our analysts recognize subtle patterns early, often before a campaign escalates, and respond with higher-confidence attribution than intelligence sourced from any single customer’s telemetry could provide. AI-accelerated operations, expert-led decisions Defender Experts MDR also combines advanced AI and generative AI with seasoned human experts. AI filters noise, grades and classifies incidents, and accelerates investigation at machine speed and scale, while our analysts own the outcome. According to the IDC MarketScape, “70% AI-assisted workflows are enabled through automated noise filtering, AI-based grading, and agentic operations while maintaining expert decision-making.” Furthermore, “quantified outcomes noted include 97% AI classification accuracy, 77% malware/phishing agent-investigated, 72% faster resolution combining AI and humans, and 45% autonomous investigations.” The impact shows up in the work. Over the past year, Defender Experts mitigated 27,000 high-severity incidents, and the team’s threat research now contributes a meaningful share of all Defender detections, enriching protection for customers well beyond the MDR service itself. Throughout, a dedicated security delivery expert and on-demand access to our experts keep customers i… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalCheck Point Research By Yarden Porat, Check Point Research Key Points Check Point Research analyzed Cloudflare Code Mode, a technique that changes how AI agents use MCP by turning tools into a TypeScript API the model can write code against. The research uncovered five vulnerabilities in workerd, the open-source runtime behind Code Mode and Cloudflare Workers. Two were rated Critical by Cloudflare. The blast radius is broad: by Cloudflare’s own numbers, Workers is built by millions of developers ,[1] serves millions of requests per second ,[2] and carries more than 10% of all traffic on Cloudflare’s network .[3] Because workerd underpins both Code Mode sandboxes and Workers tenant isolation, the findings create sandbox-escape and cross-tenant exposure risk. Cloudflare’s managed Workers environment has been fixed in production. Self-hosted workerd / Code Mode deployments should update to v1.20260619.1. Check Point Research released proof-of-concept code as part of its Black Hat USA 2026 presentation. The short version We set out to break Cloudflare Code Mode , and ended up breaking Cloudflare Workers too. We did both by targeting workerd , the runtime beneath both: an in-process sandbox that relies entirely on V8 to isolate untrusted code. We found five memory-corruption bugs in workerd’s native C++ (the “glue” between JavaScript and the runtime), and turned them into two end-to-end attacks: Cross-tenant heap swipe. An out-of-bounds read in URLPattern lets one Worker reach across the shared process heap and swipe another tenant’s secrets . Code Mode sandbox escape. Starting from a prompt injection, a use-after-free in node:zlib breaks out of the sandbox and runs native code on the host . Part I – Understanding the target 1. Where this started: Code Mode Code Mode is Cloudflare’s take on LLM tool use. Instead of a model emitting structured tool calls one at a time, Code Mode exposes the available tools as a typed TypeScript API and lets the model write code that calls them: loops, conditionals, data shuffling and all. In the traditional MCP / tool-calling loop, the model emits one {tool, args} call, the agent runs it, feeds the result back. The model then emits the next call. Every step is a fresh model invocation, and usually a network round-trip. Code Mode collapses that: the model writes one program that orchestrates many tool calls itself (looping, branching, and combining intermediate results locally) and only the final output returns to the model. Cloudflare’s argument is that LLMs, trained on enormous amounts of real-world code, are simply better at writing a program against a typed API than at emitting long chains of synthetic tool calls. [4] Figure 1 – Tool calling vs. Code Mode That code has to run somewhere, and that “somewhere” is workerd , the runtime behind Cloudflare Workers. 2. The workerd origin story To understand workerd, start with the product it was built for: Cloudflare Workers . Workers is Cloudflare’s serverless platform: you upload a piece of code and Cloudflare runs it at the edge , in data centers close to the user, on demand for every request. There’s no server to manage and, ideally, no cold machine to wait for. That model creates a hard isolation problem. Cloudflare runs code from a huge number of different customers, and to keep latency and cost down it packs many of them onto the same machines, and, as we’ll see, into the same process. The classic answer (a container or VM per tenant) is far too heavy for this: each one adds tens to hundreds of milliseconds of cold start and a real memory footprint, which is exactly what an edge platform serving oceans of short requests cannot afford. Cloudflare’s answer is to isolate at the language-runtime level rather than the OS level, using V8 isolates, the same primitive Chrome uses to separate browser tabs. An isolate is a lightweight, independent JavaScript context. Many can live inside a single process, each starts in single-digit milliseconds, and the isolate is the security… | Check Point Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A thriving gray market has emerged offering discounted access to AI models through fraudulent account registrations that exploit free trials and startup credits. Services like Poison Claude and Ecomagent offer 70-90% discounts by creating fake accounts on platforms such as AWS Bedrock and Google Cloud, then reselling access through custom API endpoints. The demand is driven by cost considerations, access restrictions in regions like China, and desire for anonymity. Fraudulent registration campaigns targeting AI video services show over 105,000 brute-force signup attempts using bots, VPNs, and disposable email domains. The operations leverage residential proxies to evade detection and accept cryptocurrency payments. These services operate through sophisticated AI gateways and are advertised on underground forums and messaging platforms, particularly in Chinese-language markets, representing a significant platform abuse challenge for AI service providers. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | – | HighTenable Research Discover how Tenable Hexa AI closes the gap between exposure management and endpoint patching using intent-driven routines, smart guardrails, and human approval. Key takeaways The problem: A slow handoff between security workflows creates a days-long remediation gap. The solution: Tenable Hexa AI bridges this gap using intent-driven Routines that automate scoping, deployment, and verification across integrated platforms like Jamf. Safety and control: Autonomy is governed by the harness built into Tenable One, ensuring the AI operates strictly within defined user permissions and guardrails. Find the exposure. Fix it. Confirm it is gone. Those three steps are rarely executed in a single place, by a single team. Exposure management knows which assets are at risk, while endpoint management actually changes the machine and applies the fix. Between those two domains of exposure identification and remediation lies a slow, manual handoff and multi-step routine that costs security teams days or weeks while vulnerabilities remain exposed: Scope the asset group Aim the remediation policy Execute patch deployment Check status Re-scan the environment to confirm the finding was closed. Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , now spans that handoff, so you don’t have to manually toggle among tools or continually restart the conversation. How does Tenable Hexa AI autonomously close the remediation loop Say there’s an actively exploited Chrome vulnerability, and a fleet of your Macs is still running the vulnerable version. Rather than navigating multiple tools, you simply tell Tenable Hexa AI to patch it. Tenable Hexa AI executes the workflow in three unified stages: Enumeration and mapping - Tenable Hexa AI enumerates the affected assets across your exposure sources and resolves them to the devices your endpoint team already manages in Jamf. Policy identification - Tenable Hexa AI maps the CVE to the version that fixes it, then finds the Jamf patch definition that delivers that version. Proposal presentation - Before writing any changes, Tenable Hexa AI stops and shows you a proposal detailing the number of devices, which devices, what policy, and what the deployment window looks like. It highlights the blast radius and it tells you plainly that the action does not roll itself back. If you need to narrow enumeration to one business unit, just tell Hexa and it will re-scope and return a new plan before executing any changes. Once you approve, Tenable Hexa AI creates a static group in Jamf holding exactly the devices you approved, then triggers the policy against it. Ask Hexa for status at any point, and it returns the rollout device by device, without you leaving the chat window. Tenable Hexa AI then schedules a re-scan for after the patch deployment window. What previously took days across multiple tools now takes minutes within a single conversation, and all you need to do is make one decision rather than coordinate the manual execution of multiple, complex steps. Hand off recurring security work to intent-driven routines The ultimate goal of agentic AI for security is to help security teams efficiently and effectively scale cyber defense by taking on complex manual routines. To carry out vulnerability remediation and validation routines with Tenable Hexa AI, you define three core elements in plain, natural language: An objective - State what you are trying to achieve, in the words you would use with a colleague, not a sequence of steps (e.g., “Triage and patch critical vulnerabilities across MacOS endpoints”). Guardrails - Set explicit operational limits (e.g., “Never launch a credentialed scan against anything tagged OT,” or “Open no more than twenty-five tickets in a run”). A cadence - Choose whether to run the routine on demand or tell Hexa to run it on a specific schedule. Tenable Hexa AI drafts the plan using capabilities discovered from the tools you have already connected to Tenable One.… | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek In May 2025, Madera Community Hospital in California experienced a data breach where hackers accessed its network for two days and likely exfiltrated personal, financial, and medical information of approximately 150,810 individuals. The compromised data includes names, contact details, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, account credentials, financial account information, treatment and health insurance information, and limited biometric data. The hospital engaged experts to analyze the breach and has notified affected individuals and the US Department of Health and Human Services. The extortion group responsible withdrew its ransom demand, stating they did not want to harm patients. The hospital has taken steps to investigate, secure systems, and notified law enforcement. | SecurityWeek | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-62434Xen · A guest started with Populated on Demand enabled (PoD) can attempt to reclaim pages which aren't regular guest RAM Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-62434 CVE-2026-62434 is a vulnerability in Xen where a guest started with Populated on Demand (PoD) enabled can attempt to reclaim pages that are not regular guest RAM. This behavior can lead to corruption of the memory management state within Xen. The vulnerability has a medium severity rating and does not have known exploits in the wild. No affected versions or patches are explicitly stated in the available data. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Threat actors are leveraging email addresses exposed in data breaches attributed to the ShinyHunters extortion group to conduct sextortion email scams. These emails demand $2,000 in Bitcoin from recipients, attempting to extort money by threatening to release compromising information. This is a phishing campaign exploiting leaked personal data rather than a software vulnerability. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Swiss rail vehicle manufacturer Stadler Rail says the Everest ransomware gang demanded about $12.3 million after breaching a data exchange platform shared with one of its suppliers. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Medium | 5.9 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium5.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56444 In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.20.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound is configured with 'serve-expired: yes' and 'serve-expired-client-timeout > discard-timeout > 0' (contrary to the suggested values), the discard-timeout branch during the serve expired logic drops an aged client reply without performing the correct accounting for the number of reply addresses for the query. Other identical branches outside of serve expired perform the correct decrement. Since the counter is never decremented in such scenario, it can reach the maximum limit and new clients for duplicate in-flight queries are silently dropped resulting in degradation of resolution service. A malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability by querying the resolver for a client-controlled slow-on-demand authoritative zone that can drive the counter past the threshold. Shipped defaults for 'serve-expired-client-timeout: 1800' and 'discard-timeout: 1900' make the branch unreachable. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-62516Oracle Demantra Demand Management · SQL Injection High8.8EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-62516 CVE-2026-62516 is a high-severity vulnerability in Oracle Demantra Demand Management versions 12.2.3 through 12.2.15. It allows a low privileged attacker with network access to exploit SQL-based weaknesses to compromise the product. Successful exploitation can lead to full takeover of the Oracle Demantra Demand Management system, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.9 | EPSS 0.4% | Critical9.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61041 Vulnerability in the Oracle Demantra Demand Management product of Oracle Supply Chain (component: Product Security). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Demantra Demand Management. While the vulnerability is in Oracle Demantra Demand Management, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Demantra Demand Management. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.9 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-60840 Vulnerability in the Oracle Demand Signal Repository product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Internal Operations). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via SQL to compromise Oracle Demand Signal Repository. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Demand Signal Repository accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Demand Signal Repository accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Attendees will be able to interact with leading solution providers and other end users facing similar challenges in securing a variety of cloud deployments. The post Watch on Demand: Cloud & Data Security Summit appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-53994ProFTPD · Heap-based Buffer Overflow High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53994 ProFTPD mod_sftp contains a heap-based buffer overflow reachable by an authenticated SFTP user. The fxp_packet_read() function accepts the attacker-supplied 32-bit big-endian SFTP packet length without a minimum sanity check. A value of 0 causes an unsigned subtraction elsewhere in the read path to underflow to approximately 4 GB. That oversized request reaches the core memory allocator, where the rounded size is computed in size_t but passed to new_block() as a 32-bit int; the low 32 bits of 0x100000000 are 0, so new_block() returns a small (~512-byte) block while the caller is told it received ~4 GB. The subsequent fill loop then streams attacker-controlled bytes past the end of the 544-byte allocation, producing an attacker-controlled heap buffer overflow. An authenticated user can crash the per-connection ProFTPD session child on demand with a single malformed SFTP packet (packet_len=0 followed by a body greater than approximately 544 bytes), producing reliable authenticated remote denial of service. Depending on heap layout and adjacent allocations, heap metadata corruption and further consequences beyond denial of service may be possible, though only denial of service is demonstrated by the supplied proof of concept. | CVE Database V5 |
Page 3 of 7