Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.11.7, Cache Middleware contains an information disclosure vulnerability caused by improper handling of HTTP cache control directives. The middleware does not respect standard cache control headers such as `Cache-Control: private` or `Cache-Control: no-store`, which may result in private or authenticated responses being cached and subsequently exposed to unauthorized users. Version 4.11.7 has a patch for the issue.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.11.7, IP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The `IPV4_REGEX` pattern and `convertIPv4ToBinary` function in `src/utils/ipaddr.ts` do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls. Version 4.11.7 contains a patch for the issue.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.11.4, there is a flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s alg value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the alg option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.11.4.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.11.4, there is a flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.11.4.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions from 1.1.0 to before 4.10.2, Hono’s JWT Auth Middleware does not provide a built-in aud (Audience) verification option, which can cause confused-deputy / token-mix-up issues: an API may accept a valid token that was issued for a different audience (e.g., another service) when multiple services share the same issuer/keys. This can lead to unintended cross-service access. Hono’s docs list verification options for iss/nbf/iat/exp only, with no aud support; RFC 7519 requires that when an aud claim is present, tokens MUST be rejected unless the processing party identifies itself in that claim. This issue has been patched in version 4.10.2.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Versions 4.8.0 through 4.9.5 contain a flaw in the getPath utility function which could allow path confusion and potential bypass of proxy-level ACLs (e.g. Nginx location blocks). The original implementation relied on fixed character offsets when parsing request URLs. Under certain malformed absolute-form Request-URIs, this could lead to incorrect path extraction depending on the application and environment. If proxy ACLs are used to protect sensitive endpoints such as /admin, this flaw could have allowed unauthorized access. The confidentiality impact depends on what data is exposed: if sensitive administrative data is exposed, the impact may be high, otherwise it may be moderate. This issue is fixed in version 4.9.6.
@hono/node-server is an adapter that allows users to run Hono applications on Node.js. Since v1.3.0, @hono/node-server has used its own Request object with `url` behavior that is unexpected. In the standard API, if the URL contains `..`, here called "double dots", the URL string returned by Request will be in the resolved path. However, the `url` in @hono/node-server's Request as does not resolve double dots, so `http://localhost/static/.. /foo.txt` is returned. This causes vulnerabilities when using `serveStatic`. Modern web browsers and a latest `curl` command resolve double dots on the client side, so this issue doesn't affect those using either of those tools. However, problems may occur if accessed by a client that does not resolve them. Version 1.4.1 includes the change to fix this issue. As a workaround, don't use `serveStatic`.