I’ve published a report detailing a critical, **unpatched vulnerability** in Apple’s iOS activation infrastructure.
It affects all iPhones during initial setup — even after a factory reset, with no jailbreak, no Apple ID, and no MDM.
# Key Findings:
* The Apple endpoint [`https://humb.apple.com/humbug/baa`](https://humb.apple.com/humbug/baa) **accepts unauthenticated XML provisioning payloads**
* The server responds with `HTTP 200 OK` and applies **persistent, device-level configuration chang
Vulnerabilities Found in Preinstalled apps on Android Smartphones could perform factory reset of device, exfiltrate PIN code or inject an arbitrary intent with system-level privileges
While experimenting with the idea of converting a normal USB (e.g., SanDisk) into a BadUSB or Rubber Ducky device, I explored its technical limitations and potential uses for cybersecurity learning.
This write-up documents what worked, what didn’t, and why reprogrammable microcontrollers (like those in Digispark or Rubber Ducky) are essential for true HID emulation.
I also shared a hands-on PowerShell experiment for extracting Wi-Fi credentials as a basic USB-based manual attack vector.
While preparing for CEH and doing passive analysis of a live WordPress-based site, I came across a full vulnerability chain — including user enumeration, exposed backup files, SQLi, and insecure headers.
I documented the process, wrote a responsible disclosure report, and summarized the technical lessons in this article. Feedback from professionals here would be highly appreciated.
Link above ⬆️
Hey everyone,
I'm excited to share **XAttacker V50 Pro**, a professional, high-powered exploitation tool designed for scanning and automatically exploiting vulnerabilities in web applications. By simply providing a target URL, XAttacker analyzes the website’s architecture—especially if it's built on a Content Management System (CMS)—and identifies weaknesses based on the detected platform. Once vulnerabilities are found, XAttacker automatically generates a working exploit tailored for the targe
Intel BootGuard has kept most Skylake/Kaby-Lake/Coffee-Lake laptops locked away from coreboot – until now.
At the end of 2024, Ubuntu developer Mate Kukri introduced **deguard**, a small utility that leverages **CVE-2017-5705** inside ME 11.x to *disable* BootGuard fuses in SRAM. The result: previously “un-coreboot-able” machines – e.g. **Lenovo T480/T480s** and **Dell OptiPlex 3050** – can boot unsigned firmware again. It has been presented and discussed at the **Dasharo Developers vPub 0xE**,
In this post, I break down how the BadUSB attack works—starting from its origin at Black Hat 2014 to a hands-on implementation using an Arduino UNO and custom HID firmware. The attack exploits the USB protocol's lack of strict device type enforcement, allowing a USB stick to masquerade as a keyboard and inject malicious commands without user interaction.
The write-up covers:
* How USB device firmware can be repurposed for attacks
* Step-by-step guide to converting an Arduino UNO into a BadUSB
