The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has triggered a surge in cybercriminal activity. Over 8,000 newly registered domains with conflict-related keywords have been identified, many of which may be weaponized in future campaigns. Multiple cases of malicious activity have been observed, including targeted attacks using conflict-themed lures, deployment of the LOTUSLITE backdoor, fake news blogs leading to StealC malware, phishing sites impersonating government portals, donation scams, fraudulent storefronts, and meme-coin pump-and-dump schemes. Threat actors are leveraging various techniques such as DLL sideloading, shellcode execution, and social engineering to compromise victims. The campaigns demonstrate the opportunistic nature of cybercriminals in exploiting geopolitical events for malicious purposes.
A campaign using fake Zoom and Google Meet pages to lure victims into fraudulent video calls has been identified. The attackers use these pages to deliver remote-access software. Multiple domains hosting identical fake meeting pages were discovered, with one domain previously linked to a ClickFix campaign. The fake interfaces show an active meeting with expected participants. When victims join, they are prompted to download a file disguised as a Zoom update. Various payloads were identified, including executables masquerading as meeting updates, MSI installers deploying legitimate remote support software, and commercial monitoring software configured for covert remote access. The campaign's goal appears to be establishing remote access using whichever tool is most effective.
Multiple phishing campaigns were identified using workplace meeting lures, PDF attachments, and abuse of legitimate binaries to deliver signed malware. The attacks used digitally signed executables masquerading as legitimate software to install remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect, Tactical RMM, and Mesh Agent. These tools enabled attackers to establish persistence and move laterally within compromised environments. The malware was signed using an Extended Validation certificate issued to TrustConnect Software PTY LTD. The campaigns demonstrate how familiar branding and trusted digital signatures can be exploited to bypass user suspicion and gain an initial foothold in enterprise networks.
A significant joint offensive by the US and Israel has triggered a multi-vector retaliatory campaign from Iran, leading to an escalation in cyberattacks. Iran's limited internet connectivity is likely hindering state-aligned threat actors' ability to coordinate sophisticated attacks. Hacktivist groups are targeting perceived adversaries, while other nation-state actors may exploit the situation. Observed activities include phishing campaigns, DDoS attacks, data exfiltration, and wiper attacks. Multiple Iranian state-aligned personas and collectives have claimed responsibility for various disruptive operations. Pro-Russian hacktivist groups have also been active, targeting Israeli systems and infrastructure. The situation remains fluid, and organizations are advised to implement multi-layered defenses and focus on foundational security hygiene.
Microsoft has discovered phishing campaigns exploiting OAuth's redirection mechanisms to bypass conventional defenses. Attackers create malicious applications with redirect URIs pointing to malicious domains, then distribute phishing links prompting targets to authenticate. The attack abuses OAuth's error handling to redirect users from trusted providers to attacker-controlled sites for phishing or malware delivery. Campaigns targeted government and public sectors using e-signature, financial, and political lures. Some attacks led to malware downloads and endpoint compromise via PowerShell and DLL side-loading. Mitigation involves governing OAuth apps, limiting user consent, reviewing permissions, and implementing cross-domain detection across email, identity, and endpoint.
A recent PlugX campaign utilized phishing emails with a 'Meeting Invitation' lure to deploy malware through DLL side-loading. The infection chain begins with a zip file containing a malicious .csproj file and MSBuild executable. The .csproj file downloads three components: a legitimate G DATA Antivirus executable, a malicious Avk.dll (PlugX variant), and an encrypted AVKTray.dat file. The malware uses DLL side-loading, API hashing, and XOR encryption for obfuscation. It establishes persistence via the Run registry key and communicates with a command and control server. The campaign showcases PlugX's continued evolution while maintaining its core characteristics, highlighting its ongoing relevance in cyber-espionage operations.
This analysis details how threat actors are exploiting Windows File Explorer's WebDAV functionality to deliver malware. WebDAV, a legacy protocol, is being used to trick users into downloading malicious files without going through web browsers, potentially bypassing security controls. Campaigns often use complex chains of scripts and legitimate files to deliver Remote Access Trojans (RATs). The tactic has been observed since February 2024, with increased activity from September 2024. Threat actors frequently abuse Cloudflare Tunnel demo accounts to host WebDAV servers. The report explains WebDAV links, how File Explorer can be manipulated, and various methods used by attackers, including URL shortcut files and LNK files. It also highlights the prevalence of German and English language campaigns targeting European corporate email accounts.
A sophisticated phishing campaign impersonating Tesseract OCR was discovered, utilizing typosquatting and ClickFix techniques. The attack chain, named OCRFix, employed multi-stage malware deployments with heavy obfuscation and defense evasion techniques, including EtherHiding. The campaign used BNB Smart Chain TestNet to hide C2 domains through smart contracts. The malware delivery process involved three stages: a loader, a secondary loader for persistence, and a bot listener. The final payload connected to a bot control panel, allowing attackers to manage infected hosts and deploy additional malware. The campaign demonstrated a combination of simple initial access methods with complex delivery chains, highlighting the ongoing effectiveness of techniques like ClickFix and the importance of robust phishing defenses.
Threat actors have discovered a novel method to bypass security controls by abusing the .arpa top-level domain (TLD) in conjunction with IPv6 tunnels. They are exploiting a feature in DNS record management of certain providers to add IP address records for .arpa domains, allowing them to host phishing content on domains that should not resolve to an IP address. The phishing campaigns use spam emails impersonating major brands, with hyperlinked images leading to malicious websites through traffic distribution systems. This technique weaponizes trusted infrastructure essential for network operations, making it challenging for security tools to detect suspicious domains based on reputation, registration information, or policy blocklists.
This analysis examines a sophisticated multi-stage infection chain utilizing Agent Tesla malware. The attack begins with a phishing email containing a RAR file, which includes an obfuscated JSE file. This initial stage triggers a series of script-based evasions, leading to the download and decryption of a PowerShell script. The malware then employs process hollowing to inject its payload into a legitimate Windows process, evading detection. Before exfiltrating data, the malware performs anti-analysis checks to avoid security software and virtual environments. Finally, Agent Tesla harvests sensitive information, including browser cookies and contacts, exfiltrating the data via SMTP to a command-and-control server.
A series of targeted phishing campaigns in Taiwan have been observed disseminating Winos 4.0 (ValleyRat) malware and associated plugins. The attacks exploit local business processes using themes like tax audits and e-invoices. The campaigns employ various techniques including malicious LNK files, DLL sideloading, and Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. The malware utilizes UAC bypassing, driver loading, and process termination to evade detection and disable security software. The attacks are attributed to a subgroup of the Silver Fox APT, showing sophisticated localization and evolving evasion techniques. The campaigns have been active since at least January 2026, using consistent infrastructure and development identifiers.
Infoblox security researchers have discovered a group of malicious domains hosting cryptocurrency scams, some linked to hacked YouTube channels. The domains, initially registered under CryptDesignBot, frequently change registrars to conceal information. They use lookalike domains to impersonate legitimate brands. Hacked YouTube channels are exploited to promote scam crypto domains through fake livestreams. The scams often claim to double cryptocurrency, mimicking old RuneScape scams. Many domains use keywords associated with celebrities and brands like Elon Musk and Tesla. Protective measures include implementing protective DNS, securing cookies, using HTTPS, generating random session IDs, and setting session timeouts. Infoblox's BloxOne Threat Defense offers protective DNS capabilities to combat sophisticated threats.
This analysis reveals the growing threat of malicious OAuth applications in Microsoft Entra ID, which attackers use for persistence and privilege escalation. The report details how these apps blend in with legitimate integrations, making detection challenging. It describes the creation of OAuth Apps Scout, an automated detection pipeline that identifies emerging malicious OAuth apps. The research uncovered multiple campaigns, including one involving 19 apps impersonating well-known brands. The report compares tactics from 2019 to 2025, showing an evolution in attacker strategies from Microsoft impersonation to third-party SaaS spoofing. It concludes with actionable defense strategies for organizations to protect against these threats.
A sophisticated spam campaign exploited Atlassian Jira Cloud to bypass security controls and target government and corporate entities. The attackers used legitimate Atlassian Cloud infrastructure to create disposable Jira instances, leveraging the platform's trusted domain reputation. The campaign targeted specific language groups, including English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Russian speakers, with tailored emails redirecting to investment scams and online casinos. The operation demonstrated high automation and abuse of SaaS workflows, highlighting the need for reassessing trust assumptions in cloud-generated emails. The campaign utilized Keitaro Traffic Distribution System for redirects and focused on organizations already using Atlassian Jira, exploiting their familiarity with Jira-related emails.
This article explores the misuse of QR codes in phishing attacks, focusing on three key areas: QR codes with URL shorteners concealing malicious destinations, in-app deep links used to steal credentials and control victims' apps, and QR codes bypassing app store security via direct malicious app downloads. The research reveals an average of 11,000 daily detections of malicious QR codes, with financial services being the most targeted industry. Attackers are leveraging QR code shorteners, in-app deep links, and direct downloads to evade security controls and exploit users' trust in QR codes. The article highlights specific attack scenarios, including account takeovers through messaging apps and distribution of suspicious gambling apps.
Netskope Threat Labs has identified multiple phishing campaigns exploiting video conference invitations from Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet. The attackers use fake meeting invites to trick users into downloading malicious payloads disguised as software updates. These payloads are actually legitimate, digitally signed remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools like Datto RMM, LogMeIn, or ScreenConnect. By leveraging these tools, attackers gain administrative remote access to victims' machines, potentially leading to data theft or further malware deployment. The campaigns use convincing phishing pages that mimic legitimate video conferencing platforms, exploiting users' urgency to join scheduled calls. This sophisticated approach allows attackers to bypass traditional security measures and establish a persistent foothold in corporate networks.
An attack campaign targeting organizations in the US, Canada, UK, and Northern Ireland exploits ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities. The attack chain begins with a spoofed email containing a malicious .cmd attachment, which executes silently, escalates privileges, disables Windows SmartScreen, and removes the Mark-of-the-Web. It then installs a legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management tool, ScreenConnect, which is abused as a Remote Access Trojan for persistent command-and-control access. The campaign focuses on sectors with high-value data, including government, healthcare, and logistics. The attackers use various techniques to evade detection, including UAC bypass, registry modification, and silent MSI installation. The ScreenConnect client used has a revoked certificate, highlighting the importance of blocking vulnerable software versions and enforcing strict RMM allowlists.
A recent investigation reveals that the APT-C-28 (ScarCruft) group has expanded its targets to include the cryptocurrency industry. The group employs sophisticated phishing tactics, using LNK files disguised as PDFs to lure victims with investment proposals ranging from $1-3 million. Upon execution, a multi-stage payload deployment occurs, ultimately installing MiradorShell v2.0 to gain system control. The attack chain involves file downloads, decryption, and the creation of scheduled tasks for persistence. MiradorShell, an AutoIt-based backdoor, connects to a command and control server, offering reverse shell capabilities, file management, remote program execution, and victim fingerprinting. The malware employs various evasion techniques, including inline library files and direct API calls.
A new hacking group called Punishing Owl has emerged, targeting Russian critical infrastructure. Their first attack on December 12, 2025, compromised a Russian state security agency, leaking internal documents. The group used DNS manipulation, created fake subdomains, and sent phishing emails to the victim's partners. They employed a PowerShell stealer called ZipWhisper to exfiltrate browser data. Punishing Owl's attacks are politically motivated and focus exclusively on Russian targets, including government agencies, scientific institutions, and IT organizations. The group has established a presence on cybercriminal forums and social media, likely operating from Kazakhstan. Experts predict this group will continue to be a persistent threat in the Russian cyberspace.
A major cybercriminal operation called Rublevka Team has generated over $10 million through cryptocurrency theft since 2023. The group employs a network of social engineering specialists who direct victims to malicious pages impersonating legitimate crypto services. Using custom JavaScript scripts, they trick users into connecting wallets and authorizing fraudulent transactions. Rublevka Team's infrastructure is fully automated, offering affiliates access to tools for launching high-volume scams. Their model poses a growing threat to cryptocurrency platforms and brands, with potential for reputational and legal risks. The group's agility in rotating domains and targeting lower-cost chains like Solana undermines traditional fraud detection efforts.
