Threat database

Archive::Tar versions before 3.10 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via attacker controlled entry size field in tar header. _read_tar() reads each entry's payload with $handle->read($$data, $block), where $block is derived from the entry's 12-byte size field in the tar header with no upper bound on that value. A crafted header declaring a multi-gigabyte size causes Perl to allocate a scalar of that size.

Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl contain a vulnerability where hardlinks in tar archives can be extracted to attacker-controlled paths outside the intended extraction directory. This occurs because the function handling special files does not validate linknames against absolute paths or directory traversal sequences. As a result, an attacker can create a hardlink that points to a victim file's inode, allowing modification of that file through the extracted name. Additionally, file metadata such as mode, owner, and timestamps are applied to the victim file during extraction.

Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target. A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.