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In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 10/15/2026, 12:14:08 UTC Added: 10/15/2026, 12:34:09 UTC |
CVE-2026-110724 is a vulnerability in Eclipse Connected Services Platform's api-gateway component up to version 1.7.3. The default rate-limit key resolver uses the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header, which is controlled by the client and not validated against trusted proxies. This allows an attacker to bypass rate limiting by using multiple unique header values, effectively obtaining unlimited independent rate-limit buckets. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 10/15/2026, 12:11:22 UTC Added: 10/15/2026, 12:34:09 UTC |
CVE-2026-110726 affects the Eclipse Connected Services Platform's api-gateway component in versions 1.5.4 through 1.7.3. The default rate-limit key resolver uses the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For header to identify clients without validating it against a trusted proxy list. This allows an attacker to bypass rate limiting by supplying unique header values, effectively obtaining unlimited independent rate-limit buckets. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 10/15/2026, 11:58:03 UTC Added: 10/15/2026, 12:04:09 UTC |
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