Threat Intelligence Database

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: "API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer." The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints. Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access — instant privilege escalation in the worst case. Version 0.3.4 fixes the issue.

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.1, none of the response paths in `internal/web/` or `internal/api/` set the standard browser-security headers. `grep` for `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy` returns zero matches across the codebase. Version 0.3.1 fixes the issue.

CVE-2026-47722 is a high-severity code injection vulnerability in juev's nebula-mesh, a self-hosted control plane for the Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Versions prior to 0.3.2 improperly interpolate user-supplied ListenHost and TunDevice fields into a text/template without sufficient validation, allowing potential code injection. The issue is fixed in version 0.3.2.