Threat Intelligence Database

NanaZip is the 7-Zip derivative intended for the modern Windows experience. Prior to 6.5.1749.0, NanaZip's seven in-house IInArchive handlers in NanaZip.Codecs unconditionally dereference the caller-supplied Indices array inside Extract when the archive engine signals extract everything by passing Indices as NULL and NumItems as 0xFFFFFFFF. This causes a NULL pointer dereference in the standard Test archive or Extract all code path for WebAssembly, ElectronAsar, Zealfs, Romfs, Ufs, Littlefs, and DotNetSingleFile archives, resulting in a process crash. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.1749.0.

NanaZip is the 7-Zip derivative intended for the modern Windows experience. Prior to 6.5.1749.0, NanaZip's WebAssembly archive handler in NanaZip.Codecs.Archive.WebAssembly.cpp allocates buffers from attacker-controlled 32-bit section and custom-name length fields without validating them against the data present in the file. A tiny crafted module can force multi-gigabyte allocations during listing or extraction through NameSize, Information.Size, and std::string or vector allocation paths, causing memory exhaustion or process termination. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.1749.0.

NanaZip is the 7-Zip derivative intended for the modern Windows experience. Prior to 6.5.1749.0, NanaZip's UFS and FFS image handler in NanaZip.Codecs.Archive.Ufs.cpp validates the superblock block size only against the MINBSIZE lower bound and does not validate the fs_fsize fragment size, allowing attacker-controlled 32-bit fields to flow into indirect-block, directory, and extraction buffer allocations. A tiny crafted UFS image can force multi-gigabyte allocations during open or extraction, causing memory exhaustion or process termination. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.1749.0.

NanaZip is the 7-Zip derivative intended for the modern Windows experience. Prior to 6.5.1749.0, NanaZip's .NET single-file bundle handler in NanaZip.Codecs.Archive.DotNetSingleFile.cpp sizes its extraction buffer from the bundle entry Size field, which is only checked for sign and is not validated against the real file size. A crafted bundle can cause an attacker-chosen allocation inside Extract, where std::bad_alloc or std::length_error can escape across the COM STDMETHODCALLTYPE boundary and crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.1749.0.