Threat Intelligence Database

NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. From 1.1.0 until 3.0.4, and in 3.1.0, the public getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl and deprecated getFormDefinitionById GraphQL resolvers are reachable without CommonGroundAuthentication and forward a caller-influenced URL through ObjectenApiService.getObjectByUrl to ObjectsApiClient.getObjectByUrl, which attaches the privileged Objecten-API token. The host-equality check restricts requests to the configured Objecten-API host but does not constrain the scheme, port, or path, allowing an unauthenticated caller to induce a token-bearing request to a chosen endpoint on that host. Standard deployments are not exposed to cross-host SSRF, token capture requires attacker-controlled routing on the configured host, and typed deserialization limits returned data to objects shaped like form definitions. The 3.0 release line is fixed in version 3.0.4. The advisory does not identify a fixed 3.1 release.

NL Portal Backend Libraries versions prior to 3.0.3 contain an improper authorization vulnerability. Authenticated users can access documents belonging to other users via specific GraphQL and REST API endpoints without proper ownership checks. Document identifiers are random but may leak through other means, exposing potentially sensitive personal information. This issue is resolved in version 3.0.3.

NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. In versions up to and including 3.0.0, deployments using the shipped default configuration exposed two GraphQL developer features without requiring authentication: the GraphiQL playground, an interactive UI for issuing GraphQL queries; and schema introspection, which lets a caller download the full description of every query, mutation, type, and argument the API supports. Anyone who could reach the `/graphiql` endpoint could open the playground in a browser, pull the full schema, and use that to map out the API and craft calls against it. By itself this does not leak user data, but it removes the guesswork from attacking the rest of the API and significantly lowers the bar for finding and exploiting other weaknesses. Version 3.0.1 patches the issue. As a workaround, override the two settings in deployed configuration.