Threat Intelligence Database

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (22ef6fa6c2b9f80d6a1f79e532a9d9ea083a1c662bc834d118879ba630842b0c) This package is not a Node.js library. `package.json` declares `"main": "sw.js"`, a Service Worker that calls `importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js')` — an API that does not exist in Node, so `require('timmytuffknuckles6')` throws immediately and the bundled obfuscated assets never execute on the installer's machine. The tarball contents are a school-unblocker / bare-mux web proxy bundle (index.html, multiple obfuscated `assets/*.js` files, WASM) wrapped in a `Riverbend Tutoring` cover page that, when served and visited in a browser, loads third-party scripts and opens popunders to external sites. There are no `preinstall`/`install`/`postinstall` lifecycle scripts, and no top-level Node-reachable code path that runs on install or require. The repository also ships `auto-publish.sh`, an author-run loop that rewrites `package.json.name` to `timmytuffknuckles1`..`timmytuffknuckles10` and republishes the same payload under each name, polluting the npm namespace with ten clones. The script is not a lifecycle hook and does not run on install. The heavy obfuscation in `assets/*.js` is consistent with the Ultraviolet/bare-mux proxy framework these projects use, not with installer-side harm. Routing to human review because the package is registry-misuse (proxy webapp masquerading as an npm library, plus deliberate ten-name namespace squatting) even though it does not attack installers. ## Source: ghsa-malware (040a672027041512418b9d898bcf26a02f2fe75f50d918b546a3283c87ffd9ee) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a8693677ff1f1f887c11d3b4f6ad3f1742c7eefd07b6b8cfabd6cfccc32bc48f) On npm install, postinstall.js runs automatically and performs two unauthorized actions against the installer. First, it POSTs a JSON fingerprint of the installing machine — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, platform, arch, node version, cwd, INIT_CWD, npm user-agent, and the sorted list of every process.env variable name — to a hardcoded webhook.site canary URL (https://webhook.site/a428f027-90c9-45e2-acca-ffbb4ea86044) that the installer never configured. Second, it walks common project locations under INIT_CWD (index.html, public/index.html, src/index.html, dist/index.html, build/index.html) and rewrites each file via fs.writeFileSync to inject a fixed-position red banner div into the page body. The environment-variable name inventory reveals which credentials are present on the host, and the HTML rewrite silently modifies files the installer owns at install time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ee2266f117d4745534d3257b98734ddfbeb31634bbbc4b3b0de9a2dee97d4e07) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.