Search: rundll32.exe
11 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-107782winsiderss System Informer · Incorrect Authorization High8.5EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-107782 System Informer versions before 4.0.26241.138 contain an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the phsvc helper. This flaw allows local attackers to access privileged APIs by connecting from any Authenticode-signed process. Exploitation involves loading code into a Microsoft-signed host process such as rundll32.exe and invoking PhSvcApiCreateService to execute code with SYSTEM privileges. The vulnerability has a high severity with a CVSS 4.0 score of 8.5. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-101882OpenClaw Windows Node · Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs High8.7EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-101882 OpenClaw Windows Node versions before 2026.7.1 have a vulnerability in the system.execApprovals.set function that allows remote callers to add overly broad allow rules. This flaw arises from incomplete validation of disallowed inputs, including wildcard-executable rules and certain system binaries like mshta, rundll32, and certutil. Exploiting this, an attacker with limited privileges can execute arbitrary commands on the Windows host without operator checks or user prompts. EPSS 0.7%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Cisco Talos disclosed a complex WebDAV infection chain linked to a Russian threat actor (UAT-10820) targeting a Ukrainian government organization. The campaign delivers the Amatera stealer along with secondary payloads such as ZigCryptoStealer and NetSupport Manager. This operation appears opportunistic and broad-based, focusing on cryptocurrency and credential theft rather than a highly targeted attack. Attackers use creative delivery and evasion techniques, including abusing legitimate infrastructure like the BNB Smart Chain for bulletproof hosting and fake CAPTCHA prompts to bypass web filters. Secondary payloads include a vulnerable driver to terminate endpoint detection and response (EDR) software and unauthorized remote access tools, enabling persistent control over infected systems. Security teams are advised to monitor for unusual WebDAV activity and suspicious DLL execution via rundll32.exe ordinal calls, educate users about fake verification prompts, and ensure endpoint solutions have robust memory scanning capabilities. No patch information is provided for this threat. The disclosure also includes a broader discussion on cybersecurity workforce mental health but is unrelated to the technical threat. | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General This analysis examines a sophisticated Vidar infostealer variant that employs a custom virtual machine to obfuscate its malicious code through proprietary bytecode interpretation. The malware implements extensive anti-analysis measures including debugger detection via NtQueryInformationProcess and RDTSC timing checks, sandbox evasion by identifying antivirus processes and checking system resources, and environment fingerprinting. Vidar targets credentials from web browsers including Chromium and Gecko-based extensions, Azure authentication tokens, FileZilla FTP credentials, and captures screenshots. It utilizes SeDebugPrivilege for elevated access, creates hidden desktops for browser automation, and exfiltrates stolen data through Telegram channels. The malware performs cleanup operations to remove execution artifacts and proxies DLL execution through rundll32.exe to blend with legitimate Windows processes. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Files built with the polyglot technique have been showing up more and more in cyberattacks in recent years. They let attackers slip malware past email filters and file scanners, deceive victims in phishing attacks, and complicate incident investigations. To pull this off, attackers deliberately construct a file that a system can interpret as different formats depending on which application opens it. A classic example is a file that can be handled as a PNG image or a ZIP archive. All it takes is changing the file’s extension, or simply using one or another application to open it. Let’s take a look at why it’s even possible to create files like this, which format combinations have turned up in real-world attacks, and how organizations can protect themselves from this threat. Why polyglot files are possible The data formats behind polyglot files are seldom exotic. It all comes down to a clever combination of common formats that happen to be structurally compatible. Polyglots exploit at least one of the following quirks in certain file formats: Most file formats need decoding from the very first byte, but some require to read them from the end. The clearest example is a ZIP archive: a corrupted or missing beginning doesn’t stop applications from reading the file, because all the needed headers actually sit at the end. This lets attackers simply glue two files together — in the example above, a PNG and a ZIP. The beginning reads as a valid PNG image, while the end reads as a valid ZIP archive. Many formats work like Russian matryoshka nesting dolls: despite outwardly having a specific extension matching its intended usage, inside the file is essentially a ZIP archive containing the necessary data. This group includes modern office documents (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), Android installation packages (APK), Java library files (JAR), and many others. Some formats have no strict structural requirements — or their requirements are loose enough that the application that’s processing the file can locate the fragment it needs even when that fragment isn’t at the beginning. The Polydet GitHub repository describes numerous examples of possible file combinations for building a polyglot. Under the MITRE classification, this technique falls under the Masquerading category ( T1036.008 , Masquerade File Type). Examples of polyglot files in known cyberattacks Publicly available malware campaign analyses reveal all kinds of polyglots. Attackers adapt the entire attack scenario to fit a specific file type combination. The Head Mare group delivered the PhantomPyramid malware as a ZIP attachment. The file consisted of Windows executable code (EXE) with a small ZIP archive glued onto the end. When the victim opened the archive, it contained a file with the extension PDF.LNK, which would then launch that same polyglot attachment — this time as an executable file. In the attack documented by JPCERT , attackers created a file that started as a PDF and was detected as a PDF by most scanners but carried a DOC extension and opened in Office applications as a valid DOC file containing malicious macros. The attacks spreading the StrRAT and Ratty Trojans used a polyglot built from a signed Windows installer package (MSI) with malicious Java code (JAR) tacked onto the end. The StrelaStealer attacks used a polyglot with an HTML extension: a Windows library (DLL) with a decoy HTML document glued onto the end. A shortcut in the archive launched the file twice: once via the start command (the equivalent of a double-click, which opened a browser showing the HTML document), and once via rundll32 (which launched the malicious DLL). In a simulated but elegant attack, researchers joined two ordinary ZIP files together and found that different popular archive tools displayed the combined file differently: some showed only the first archive, some only the second, and some showed both at once as if it were a single archive with shared contents. If the attacker is familiar with the vic… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated ClickFix campaign variant uses social engineering to trick victims into executing commands via the Windows Run dialog. The technique leverages rundll32.exe to load remote non-DLL payloads by ordinal export #1 over WebDAV connections tunneled through HTTPS port 443. Multiple incidents at a single organization show evolving obfuscation methods including WMI process spawning, caret insertion, and runtime string assembly to evade detection. The attack chain utilizes trusted Windows binaries like pcalua.exe to break process lineage tracking. No files are dropped to disk, and payloads are invoked by ordinal rather than named functions. Successful attacks exfiltrated browser credentials and sensitive documents totaling 13MB. The most obfuscated variant evaded automated EDR detection entirely, being discovered only through proactive threat hunting focused on ordinal execution patterns rather than keyword detection. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-25865Yandex Punto Switcher · Unquoted Search Path or Element High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-25865 Punto Switcher through 4.5.0.583 contains an unquoted search path element vulnerability that allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code by exploiting the application's call to WinExec without a fully qualified path for RunDll32.exe when invoking shell32.dll Control_RunDLL input.dll. Attackers can place a malicious executable earlier in the search order to achieve arbitrary code execution in the context of the affected user. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The Chinese APT group Silver Fox has launched an SEO poisoning campaign targeting Chinese-speaking users, impersonating Microsoft Teams. The campaign uses a modified ValleyRAT loader with Cyrillic elements to mislead attribution. Silver Fox aims to conduct espionage and financial fraud, posing a significant threat due to its dual mission. The attack chain involves a fake Teams website, malicious ZIP files, and binary data retrieval from XML and JSON files. The malware exploits rundll32.exe for binary proxy execution and establishes C2 communication. Attribution to Silver Fox is based on overlapping infrastructure and links to previous campaigns. Organizations with global operations, especially in China, are advised to implement robust security measures and logging capabilities to defend against this evolving threat. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.9 | EPSS 1.3% | High8.9EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-66576 Remote Keyboard Desktop 1.0.1 enables remote attackers to execute system commands via the rundll32.exe exported function export, allowing unauthenticated code execution. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A new campaign is distributing the Oyster (Broomstick) backdoor through trojanized Microsoft Teams installers. Threat actors are using SEO poisoning and malvertising to trick users into downloading fake installers from spoofed websites. The malicious installers deploy a persistent backdoor that enables remote access, gathers system information, and supports additional payload delivery while evading detection. This tactic mirrors earlier fake PuTTY campaigns, showing a trend of abusing trusted software for initial access. The backdoor communicates with attacker-controlled C2 domains and uses DLL sideloading via rundll32.exe for stealthy execution. Organizations are advised to download software only from verified sources and avoid relying on search engine advertisements. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Matanbuchus 3.0, a malware loader available as Malware-as-a-Service, has evolved with significant updates. It now employs sophisticated techniques including improved communication protocols, in-memory stealth capabilities, enhanced obfuscation, and support for WQL queries, CMD, and PowerShell reverse shells. The loader collects detailed system data, including information on EDR security controls, to tailor subsequent attacks. It can execute various commands through regsvr32, rundll32, msiexec, or process hollowing. The malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry modifications. Recent campaigns have targeted victims through external Microsoft Teams calls impersonating IT helpdesks, leading to potential ransomware compromises. | AlienVault OTX General |
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