Threats Tagged 'mini shai-hulud'

A new Mini Shai-Hulud worm variant named Trinitite was detected targeting the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen. The attacker exploited a GitHub workflow vulnerability allowing any user to trigger npm publish via pull-request comments, resulting in rapid publication of malicious package versions. The worm uses obfuscation techniques to execute even when scripts are disabled, steals credentials from multiple developer and cloud platforms, and exfiltrates data via GitHub commits. It establishes persistence through systemd services and includes a destructive token revoke mechanism that can wipe user directories. This campaign is linked to the TeamPCP threat actor and appeared shortly after arrests of related suspects in Australia.

An attacker exploited a flawed GitHub Actions workflow in the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen to publish 10 malicious versions. The vulnerability stemmed from an issue_comment trigger lacking author-association checks, allowing arbitrary users to trigger npm publishing from forked repositories. The malicious payload used multiple execution methods, including a binding.gyp file exploiting node-gyp's Python evaluation and a preinstall hook, ultimately delivering a large obfuscated script that downloaded Bun v1.4.0. This attack aligns with the Mini Shai-Hulud toolkit previously seen in other supply chain compromises. All malicious versions have been removed from npm.

On August 4, 2026, ChainDrop, a self-propagating worm variant of Mini Shai-Hulud linked to TeamPCP, infiltrated the npm ecosystem through a compromised maintainer account of the keyv ecosystem. The attacker injected malicious code into GitHub repositories, weaponizing legitimate CI/CD pipelines to publish poisoned packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, making them indistinguishable from clean releases. ChainDrop spread to over 400 packages within four hours by stealing npm tokens and republishing infected versions. The worm employs Ethereum smart contracts for C2 infrastructure, enabling domain rotation without modifying deployed malware. It features destructive capabilities, wiping victim home directories upon token revocation, and achieves persistence through IDE and AI-agent configuration files. The payload harvests credentials from npm, GitHub, AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, and other services, exfiltrating data via GitHub repositories and EtherHiding techniques.

A large-scale software supply chain attack compromised over 400 npm packages through a self-propagating worm called ChainDrop, a new variant of Mini Shai-Hulud. The campaign exploits stolen npm publishing credentials to automatically modify and republish legitimate software releases. ChainDrop targets developer workstations and CI/CD environments, harvesting credentials from npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault before validating access and enumerating resources. The malware uses preinstall lifecycle scripts for automatic execution, establishes persistence through repository configuration modifications, and abuses GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishing workflows. After stealing credentials, it autonomously propagates by downloading packages, inserting malicious payloads, and republishing them with incremented versions, demonstrating how compromised developer identities can enable widespread ecosystem compromise.

A sophisticated supply chain attack campaign linked to Mini Shai-Hulud, Miasma, and Hades malware has compromised LeoPlatform npm packages, GitHub Actions workflows, and the Verana Blockchain Go module. The attack employs binding.gyp install-time execution, Bun-staged JavaScript malware, and encrypted credential exfiltration targeting developer and CI/CD environments. Malicious packages were published through the czirker and llxlr npm accounts in a coordinated burst on June 24, 2026. The campaign steals credentials including npm tokens, GitHub tokens, cloud provider credentials, SSH keys, and AI coding assistant configurations. Attackers use GitHub as dead-drop infrastructure and inject persistence hooks into repositories through orphan branches and fake dependency-update workflows. The RevokeAndItGoesKaboom marker connects this wave to the codfish/semantic-release-action compromise, indicating shared operational tooling.

A sophisticated supply chain attack campaign has expanded to 471 affected artifacts across npm and PyPI, targeting developers through malicious packages. The campaign uses three distinct delivery methods: executable .pth startup hooks, trojanized native .abi3.so extensions that execute at import time, and a split loader-payload architecture that searches Python's sys.path. Twenty-three newly identified PyPI packages masquerade as bioinformatics tools, AI frameworks, and popular libraries like requests and Flask. The attack deploys heavily obfuscated JavaScript stealers via Bun runtime, harvesting high-value credentials including GitHub tokens, npm registry access, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and CI/CD secrets. The malware employs anti-analysis techniques with fake LLM prompt-injection headers designed to disrupt AI-assisted security scanners, while targeting developer workstations and automated build environments.

A coordinated PyPI compromise campaign involving 37 malicious wheel artifacts across 19 packages was detected, utilizing Python startup hooks to execute credential-stealing payloads. The attack leverages .pth files for automatic execution during Python interpreter startup, downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime, and runs obfuscated JavaScript payloads. The malware targets high-value developer and CI/CD credentials including GitHub, npm, PyPI, cloud providers (AWS, GCP, Azure), Kubernetes, Vault, SSH keys, and AI tool tokens. This represents a PyPI branch of the Shai-Hulud/Miasma campaign family, using a Hades-themed variant for GitHub exfiltration. Compromised packages included established bioinformatics tools with significant download counts, stemming from apparent maintainer account takeover. The payload employs multi-layer obfuscation, AES-GCM encryption, and exfiltrates data through GitHub repositories with distinctive markers. The campaign demonstrates cross-runtime attack capabilities and ecosystem-spe...

The Mini Shai-Hulud campaign compromised 84 npm package artifacts in the TanStack namespace with credential-stealing malware targeting continuous integration systems. On May 11, 2026, attackers published 84 malicious versions across 42 TanStack packages by chaining the pull_request_target pattern, GitHub Actions cache poisoning, and extracting OIDC tokens from runner process memory. The attack affected high-profile packages including @tanstack/react-router, which receives over 12 million weekly downloads. Wiz attributes this activity to TeamPCP, which has previously compromised SAP, Checkmarx, Bitwarden and other developer tools. The campaign expanded beyond TanStack to include OpenSearch npm versions, PyPI mistralai packages, and others, using three exfiltration routes including typosquatted domains, Session messenger network, and GitHub API dead drops.

An active npm supply chain attack has compromised packages in the @antv ecosystem, affecting the maintainer account 'atool'. The attack is part of the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign, involving 639 compromised package versions across 323 unique packages. Notable affected packages include echarts-for-react with 1.1 million weekly downloads, and widely-used @antv packages for data visualization. The malware uses obfuscated install-time payloads that harvest developer credentials, GitHub tokens, npm tokens, AWS credentials, and other secrets from development and CI/CD environments. Stolen data is encrypted with AES-256-GCM and exfiltrated to a command-and-control server, with GitHub repositories used as fallback channels. The malware contains worm-like functionality to republish compromised packages and propagate through the npm ecosystem.

Socket detected 84 compromised TanStack npm package artifacts modified with credential-stealing malware targeting CI systems, including GitHub Actions. Affected packages like @tanstack/react-router have over 12 million weekly downloads. The malicious versions contain router_init.js, a heavily obfuscated file with daemonization capabilities and environment variable access for GitHub Actions secrets. The compromise exploited GitHub Actions cache poisoning and pull_request_target patterns to extract OIDC tokens and authenticate malicious npm publishes through trusted-publisher bindings. The malware harvests credentials from GitHub Actions, AWS (IMDS, Secrets Manager, SSM), HashiCorp Vault, and Kubernetes, while establishing persistence in Claude Code and VS Code directories. Exfiltration occurs through Session's decentralized P2P network. The campaign includes self-propagation mechanisms that steal npm OIDC tokens and autonomously republish compromised packages. Updates indicate expansion to OpenSearch, Mistr...