A self-propagating npm worm dubbed ChainDrop infected over 400 packages downloaded hundreds of millions of times weekly, including popular packages like keyv and cacheable-request. The worm steals cloud credentials, npm and GitHub tokens, SSH keys, and sensitive developer data while extracting temporary credentials from GitHub Actions runner memory. It uses stolen npm publishing tokens to infect additional packages while maintaining their legitimate functionality. The attackers established persistence through VS Code and Claude Code configurations, employed blockchain-based command-and-control resolution via Ethereum smart contracts, and can execute attacker-supplied code. The operator demonstrated ability to silently reconfigure C2 infrastructure through Ethereum transactions without updating deployed instances. ChainDrop employs three layers of obfuscation and encryption, exfiltrates data through encrypted channels, and publishes stolen tokens in public commit messages.
Attackers compromised a GitHub maintainer account controlling keyv, cacheable, flat-cache, and file-entry-cache Node.js packages that collectively receive over a billion downloads monthly. Malicious code was pushed directly to the main branch and automatically published to npm with valid signatures. A hidden preinstall script downloads a Bun runtime to execute an obfuscated payload that harvests npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, and Vault credentials, scans for SSH keys and environment files, and exfiltrates data to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories and Ethereum smart contracts. The worm then uses stolen npm tokens to infect additional packages autonomously. This self-propagating attack, tracked as ChainDrop, belongs to the Shai Hulud family responsible for previous campaigns targeting TanStack, Mistral AI, and OpenSearch packages in May 2026.
The popular PyPI package lightning experienced a supply chain attack affecting versions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, published on April 30, 2026. The compromise introduced malicious code that executes automatically upon module import, downloading Bun JavaScript runtime and executing an 11MB obfuscated payload. The attack harvests credentials including GitHub tokens, npm tokens, cloud credentials from AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, while targeting CI/CD environments. The malicious code poisons GitHub repositories by injecting backdoored files impersonating Claude Code commits and infects local npm packages through tarball manipulation. The attack shows similarities to previous Shai-Hulud campaigns in terms of credential targeting and obfuscation methods. Evidence suggests the maintainer's GitHub account (pl-ghost) was compromised, with suspicious branch operations and disclosure suppression indicating ongoing attacker control. The incident affects a widely-used deep learning framework receiving millions of monthly downl...