Acronym: Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) has unbounded recursion in JSONTaggedDecoder.decode_obj() may cause DoS
Affects acronymSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.1 Medium : upgrade to 2.0.0_3 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.0.0_3
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 23 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade acronym to 2.0.0_3.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
Homebrewacronympkg:brew/acronymOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary `JSONTaggedDecoder.decode_obj()` in `nltk/jsontags.py` calls itself recursively without any depth limit. A deeply nested JSON structure exceeding `sys.getrecursionlimit()` (default: 1000) will raise an unhandled `RecursionError`, crashing the Python process. ### Affected code File: `nltk/jsontags.py`, lines 47–52 ```python @classmethod def decode_obj(cls, obj): if isinstance(obj, dict): obj = {key: cls.decode_obj(val) for (key, val) in obj.items()} elif isinstance(obj, list): obj = list(cls.decode_obj(val) for val in obj) ``` ### Proof of Concept ```python import sys, json from nltk.jsontags import JSONTaggedDecoder depth = sys.getrecursionlimit() + 50 # e.g. 1050 payload = '{"x":' * depth + "null" + "}" * depth # Raises RecursionError, crashing the process json.loads(payload, cls=JSONTaggedDecoder) ``` ### Impact Any code path that passes externally-supplied JSON to `JSONTaggedDecoder` is vulnerable to denial of service. The severity depends on whether such a path exists in the calling code (e.g. `nltk/data.py`). ### Suggested Fix Add a depth parameter with a hard limit: ```python @classmethod def decode_obj(cls, obj, _depth=0): if _depth > 100: raise ValueError("JSON nesting too deep") if isinstance(obj, dict): obj = {key: cls.decode_obj(val, _depth + 1) for (key, val) in obj.items()} elif isinstance(obj, list): obj = list(cls.decode_obj(val, _depth + 1) for val in obj) ```
References
- github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-rf74-v2fm-23pw (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66393 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/00cdcd392142e6c745e7120c8d50a24127df5fad (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3724.yaml (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-denial-of-service-via-jsontaggeddecoder (opens in a new tab)