Anatomy of a scam campaign, from the point of view of a link shortener
Description
This report analyzes a scam campaign observed through the lens of a URL shortener service. The campaign involved three short links that collectively received nearly 90,000 clicks in 48 hours. The destination URLs employed sophisticated cloaking techniques, including user-agent checks, Selenium/Puppeteer detection, ad blocker detection, mouse movement sampling, and device fingerprinting to evade detection and only target real human victims. Attempts to block the malicious destination were circumvented by the attackers quickly reusing the same short links with new domains forwarding to the same scam content. The URL shortener operator implemented a fix by reserving purged slugs to prevent reuse. This analysis provides insight into the evasive tactics used in this scam campaign and the challenges in detecting it.
Reddit Discussion
I run a small URL shortener as a side project. Last week’s abuse sweep turned up a destination that had taken 89,826 clicks in 48 hours across three short links — more than everything else on the platform combined.
My scanner had scored it zero. The destination was an ordinary .com with a numeric path. Nothing to pattern-match on. I only found it because I sorted the database by click count instead of by suspicion score, which I’d never thought to do.
The destination cloaked on user agent:
| Fetched with | Response |
|---|---|
| Desktop browser | 963 bytes, redirect to google.com |
| Data-centre IP | Redirect to yahoo.com |
| Android, Facebook in-app browser | 42,748 bytes of machinery |
That payload checked for Selenium/Puppeteer fingerprints, checked for an ad blocker, sampled 80 mouse positions to confirm a human, and fingerprinted GPU/screen/battery/timezone. If any check failed it played a success animation and then did nothing, so you never learn you were caught. I never reached the final page — it kept classifying me as not-a-victim.
I assumed the destination was the valuable thing, so I blocked it. Four hours later they were back with the same three short links, now pointing at two new domains that forwarded to the same place.
Fix: purged slugs are now reserved rather than released, and the reservation is written before the delete.
Full writeup with the timeline and telemetry: https://casparwre.de/blog/anatomy-of-a-scam-campaign/
Links cited in this discussion
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
A scam campaign was detected by a URL shortener operator who noticed unusually high click volumes on three short links. The destination URLs used advanced cloaking methods, including checking for automation tools, ad blockers, and human interaction signals, to avoid detection and only serve the scam payload to real users. When the operator blocked the original destination, the attackers reused the same short links with new domains redirecting to the scam, demonstrating resilience and evasion. The operator mitigated this by reserving deleted short link slugs to prevent their reuse. The campaign highlights sophisticated evasion and persistence techniques in phishing/scam operations.
Potential Impact
The scam campaign generated significant user interaction (nearly 90,000 clicks in 48 hours), indicating a high potential for victim exposure. The use of sophisticated cloaking techniques reduced the likelihood of detection by automated scanners and security tools, increasing the risk of successful victimization. The attackers' ability to quickly reuse short links with new domains after blocking attempts shows operational resilience, complicating mitigation efforts. However, no direct exploitation or malware payload details are provided.
Defensive Guidance
The URL shortener operator implemented a fix by reserving purged short link slugs before deletion to prevent attackers from reusing them. This measure helps disrupt the attackers' ability to recycle links for continued abuse. No other specific remediation steps are indicated. Users and operators should monitor for suspicious link activity and consider implementing similar slug reservation or link reuse prevention mechanisms.
Technical Details
- Source Type
- Subreddit
- cybersecurity
- Reddit Score
- 0
- Discussion Level
- minimal
- Content Source
- reddit_link_post
- Post Type
- link
- Newsworthiness Assessment
- {"score":38,"reasons":["external_link","newsworthy_keywords:campaign","established_author","recent_news"],"isNewsworthy":true,"foundNewsworthy":["campaign"]}
- Has External Source
- true
- Trusted Domain
- false
Threat ID: 6a96b55eacd9273b49a02e52
Added to database: 09/01/2026, 11:22:06 UTC
Last enriched: 09/08/2026, 15:53:32 UTC
Last updated: 10/04/2026, 07:05:55 UTC
Views: 139
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