Open directory exposes a full SonicWall SMA1000 credential-theft campaign: 250 targets, 5 domains fully replicated
Source Reddit ThreatIntel
Exploited in the wild · KEV due 17 Jul 2026 · public exploit available (Metasploit) : block it and hunt for it in your logs now.
Data as of 10 Sep 2026, 17:52 UTC
- KEV deadline
- US federal agencies must patch by this date; a sensible deadline for everyone else.
Exploitation evidence
t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 Jul 2026
Detectable: evidence found.
nuclei template: SonicWall SMA1000 - Server-Side Request Forgery
Weaponised: evidence found.
Exploited in the wildExploited: evidence found.
Listed in CISA KEV the same day as disclosure
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
Timeline
CVE ID reserved
by sonicwall
, 4 days before disclosure
CVE published
on cve.org
, t = 0
In Threat Radar
record ingested
, 24 minutes after disclosure
Added to CISA KEV (opens in a new tab)
exploitation confirmed · ransomware use known
, the same day as disclosure
KEV remediation due
US federal deadline
, 3 days after disclosure
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA KEV (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| SonicWallSMA1000 | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Discussion
A threat actor exploited CVE-2026-15409, a critical unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in SonicWall SMA1000 appliances, to gain command execution and steal credentials. The attacker used a modified public proof-of-concept exploit to access internal Erlang services on the appliance, enabling remote code execution. This allowed extraction of LDAP configurations, Active Directory credentials, and deployment of tools to dump secrets from internal Windows systems. The campaign targeted at least 250 SonicWall SMA1000 devices across multiple countries and sectors, with confirmed credential theft in France, India, Italy, and the US. The attack leveraged compromised appliances as pivots into internal networks, exposing sensitive Active Directory data and enabling DCSync attacks against domain controllers. The targeting was opportunistic and technology-driven rather than sector-specific. The campaign was uncovered through an open directory left exposed by the attacker, providing a comprehensive view of the operation.
r/threatintel (opens in a new tab)u/Straight-Practice-990 points0 comments
The operator left their whole toolkit in an open directory, captured the same day it was still in use, which gave a fairly complete view of the campaign instead of a single victim.
Scope from the recovered files: 250 exploitable targets, LDAP config recovered from 168, 534 config records across 160 AD domains and 255 internal LDAP endpoints. SAM and LSA secrets from at least 9 domains, full DCSync against 7 DCs in 5 environments. Confirmed credential theft in France, India, Italy and the US, with the wider target list spanning the UK, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, South Korea and Hong Kong. Targeting looks opportunistic and technology-driven rather than sector-specific.
On attribution, several scripts carried extensive Chinese comments and logging, but that alone is not enough to attribute, so it is left open. One publicly reported victim, a UK council, lines up with the telemetry at moderate confidence. Full analysis and IOCs in the post.
Links cited in the discussion
Also discussed in r/Malware