CVE-2026-88058: Angular SSR · XSS via Unescaped Processing Instruction (<?...?>) Nodes in Fallback Raw-Content Elements
Affects @angular/platform-serverSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.6 High : upgrade to 22.1.4 soon.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 22.1.4, 21.2.22, 20.3.30
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade @angular/platform-server to 22.1.4; @angular/platform-server to 21.2.22; @angular/platform-server to 20.3.30.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npm@angular/platform-server | Affected
| Fixed in
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| npm@angular/platform-server | Affected
| Fixed in
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| npm@angular/platform-server | Affected
| Fixed in
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| npm@angular/platform-server | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary An XSS vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server` during server-side rendering (SSR) HTML serialization of `ProcessingInstruction` DOM nodes (`<?target data?>`, `nodeType === 7`) when nested inside fallback raw-content elements (`<noscript>`, `<iframe>`, `<noembed>`, `<noframes>`). While processing instruction data escaped `>` to `>`, it did not check for or escape matching closing tags of ancestor fallback elements (e.g., `</noscript>`). When rendered in a browser with scripting enabled, an unescaped closing tag sequence in a processing instruction prematurely closes the fallback raw-content tag and causes subsequent sibling elements to execute as live HTML. ### Technical Description In HTML5 parsing, fallback raw-content elements (`<noscript>`, `<iframe>`, `<noembed>`, `<noframes>`) place the browser's HTML tokenizer into `RAWTEXT` mode. In `RAWTEXT` mode, processing instruction tokens (`<?...?>`) are treated as literal raw text rather than bogus comments, and the parser ignores `>` or `?>`. The only token sequence that terminates the container is an end tag matching the container tag name (`</noscript`, `</iframe`, etc.). During server-side HTML serialization, processing instruction nodes previously only replaced `>` with `>` (preventing bogus comment breakouts in normal HTML data states) but left `<` untouched. Crucially, processing instruction serialization never inspected ancestor fallback raw-content tags. As a result, if a `ProcessingInstruction` node inside `<noscript>` contained `</noscript ` in its data payload, it was emitted unescaped as `<?x </noscript ?>`. ### Impact & Reachability * **Reachability**: Processing instruction nodes cannot be authored directly through standard Angular template syntax (which parses `<?...>` into comment nodes in DOM position). Reaching this vulnerability requires application or library code calling `inject(DOCUMENT).createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` or `Renderer2` DOM insertion methods with untrusted user input passed to `data` inside a fallback raw-content container. * **Impact**: In applications that programmatically construct processing instruction nodes inside fallback elements during server-side rendering, an attacker controlling the processing instruction data can break out of the container and execute arbitrary JavaScript in victims' browsers. ### Proof of Concept (Minimal Reproduction) ```ts import { Component, ElementRef, Renderer2, inject, DOCUMENT, AfterViewInit } from '@angular/core'; @Component({ selector: 'app-root', standalone: true, template: `<noscript id="host"></noscript>` }) export class AppComponent implements AfterViewInit { private r = inject(Renderer2); private el = inject(ElementRef); private doc = inject(DOCUMENT); ngAfterViewInit() { const host = this.el.nativeElement.querySelector('#host'); // Attacker-controlled input passed as Processing Instruction data const pi = this.doc.createProcessingInstruction('x', '</noscript '); this.r.appendChild(host, pi); // Sibling markup that should remain inert inside <noscript> const img = this.r.createElement('img'); this.r.setAttribute(img, 'src', 'x'); this.r.setAttribute(img, 'onerror', 'alert("SSR_PI_XSS")'); this.r.appendChild(host, img); } } ``` **Vulnerable SSR Output**: ```html <noscript><?x </noscript ?><img src="x" onerror="alert('SSR_PI_XSS')"></noscript> ``` ### Workarounds * Avoid passing untrusted user input into `document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` when the node is inserted into `<noscript>`, `<iframe>`, `<noembed>`, or `<noframes>` during server-side rendering. * Manually sanitize or replace `<` with `<` in any untrusted data passed to processing instruction nodes on the server.
References
- github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-j3r3-mxqp-r2p4 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88058 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/issues/70146 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/commit/73d8bbd27cb46495426d4132975a1355b47ad915 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/commit/89b20568dfaee1ec8e0b3bcf1872acdddd2f4fef (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/commit/ba3bc47b20b3d12f5eb141ec9c651373ae4d15e8 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/domino/commit/04f987dc08ff3736b427f50941adf1722458528f (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.30 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.22 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.4 (opens in a new tab)