Threats Tagged 'npm'

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (42d10ba1427af01794dfb0a6b39a05f969547455e9d86d75f18601b1d035c507) preinstall.js runs unconditionally on npm install and POSTs a JSON payload to a hardcoded Pipedream collector at https://f5778d1d81cc30c39dcdd0da5ca1d49a.m.pipedream.net. The payload includes os.hostname(), os.userInfo() username, platform/arch/node version, process.env.INIT_CWD, process.cwd(), the consumer project's package.json name and version, whether the consumer declares an @alphaspace dependency, npm registry hosts parsed from ~/.npmrc, CI-related environment variable names, and proxy host configuration. The same script performs DNS resolution against a hardcoded list of *.yahoo.com and *.ouryahoo.com internal hostnames (including istio-system.prod1-gq1.omega.yahoo.com and buildr.corp.yahoo.com), and for any banana.stand.*.yahoo.com name that resolves it issues an https.request with rejectUnauthorized:false, capturing the response status, Server header, and first 512 bytes of the body and forwarding them in a banana_proof field of the exfil payload. The @alphaspace scope name and an in-file 'authorized security research' banner form a dependency-confusion lure aimed at Yahoo internal builds; the installer-side behavior — host fingerprinting, npmrc/registry disclosure, and TLS-verification-disabled internal-network probing from the installer's host — fires against any machine that resolves this package.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (937f80200481fb9bef57f6dc72e7ad55bee68982b1cb7a86b909c86c46e8b2ec) Package presents itself as n8n helper nodes but ships an empty stub `index.js` (`module.exports = {}`) and no functional node modules. On `npm install`, `postinstall.js` runs automatically: it performs an HTTPS GET to `https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_pn8` — a path disguised as a PKI/Certificate-Transparency validation endpoint and unrelated to the package's advertised n8n purpose — writes the opaque response body to `/tmp/.np`, chmods it 0755, and executes it via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid /tmp/.np... &'], {detached: true})` so the process survives npm exit. There is no hash, signature, or version pinning on the downloaded bytes. The combination of hollow package contents, cover-story URL path, hidden staging path, and detached backgrounded execution constitutes an install-time binary dropper delivering arbitrary attacker-controlled code with full user privileges on the installer's host.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f49ee5bcbcb7e8f1028de4021134fdbbc895e737700cf82a834fb26d3b23dd05) postinstall.js fetches an opaque binary from https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_dn8, writes it to /tmp/.nc, chmods it 0755, and launches it detached via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid ' + OUT + '... &'], {detached:true})`. The download URL is disguised under a `.well-known/pki-validation/` path on an unrelated domain to blend in with routine HTTPS traffic. index.js is an empty stub (`module.exports = {};`), so the package has no legitimate n8n-node functionality — its only effect on install is fetching and executing the remote payload. There is no version pin, no hash or signature check, and the staging path (/tmp/.nc) plus setsid detachment are consistent with hiding the running process from the installer.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8aa25eb3d56eb14b75cbb4dedbd5d09063e4b742b53acef9a4096cc77213b8f3) The package presents itself as an n8n community node that annotates items with flow statistics, but nodes/FlowStats.node.js contains two independent attacker-benefiting mechanisms. First, a top-level IIFE runs when the module is loaded and checks for n8n-specific environment variables (N8N_USER_FOLDER, N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY, EXECUTIONS_MODE, N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED); if any are present, it performs an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded bare IP 104.21.3.16 with a spoofed Host header of mkicom.com and rejectUnauthorized disabled, writes the response body to /tmp/.fs_dev or /tmp/.fs_prod, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh with setsid. The payload path and proxy behavior switch based on whether the host has an IPv4 in 10.0.2.0/24, indicating dev-vs-prod target discrimination. The IIFE stays dormant on machines without n8n env vars, evading inspection on developer workstations. Second, the node's execute() reads cmd and k fields from item.json.query or item.json.body and, when k equals the hardcoded value 'kx9p26', passes cmd to child_process.exec with a 25-second timeout and a 16 MiB output buffer, returning stdout and stderr in the node output. Any webhook or HTTP flow that routes external input through this node therefore grants arbitrary shell command execution on the n8n host to any caller who supplies the magic key. Neither behavior is part of the advertised statistics functionality.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4135dd91724bdca6fc36f3a49906d219acc67afde7802cb1bd114d128984ca3d) The package's postinstall hook runs `node./loader.js`, which base64-decodes an ~8 KB embedded blob, XOR-decrypts it with a hardcoded 32-byte key, and pipes the resulting bytes into a detached, window-hidden `python -c -` child process via stdin. The loader also silently `pip install`s `requests` if missing. The advertised library surface in `index.js` is an explicit stub whose `connect()` throws, and `package.json` restricts installation to `os: ["win32"]`, so the tarball has no functional wallet-adapter behavior — its only effect on install is to execute the obfuscated Python payload on a Windows developer's machine. The combination of a hidden opaque payload, XOR-obfuscated delivery, detached hidden Python execution at `npm install` time, an inert cover-story main module, and OS pinning to Windows is a targeted install-time dropper.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ac3bbe97b41f8d8d1a74e9f369318620c08d648365a4e78d49d1da31d085531d) package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that auto-runs on `npm install` on Windows. The bundled 4444.vbs is a ~674KB script containing large opaque base64 blobs and an AES key/IV pair (`stateFKK`, `manifestGCP`) which it uses at runtime to decrypt an embedded payload via `CreateDecryptor().TransformFinalBlock` and hand it to `C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe` for execution. After staging, the script self-cleans with `cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 8 >nul & del /f /q... & rmdir /s /q...` to remove its own artifacts. Cover-story comments label the script a `Sync Agent — diagnostic telemetry collector` from a fictitious `Wingtip Toys Corporation`, but the code performs no telemetry-shaped behavior — it decrypts and executes an opaque payload. The package ships no other functionality; installing it on Windows results in arbitrary attacker code running under the installer's user account.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5cb86188f9853b34c6dc3cf9c8259a789920326e8ddf4ae4cd3566385bba3ea1) The package presents itself as a dotenv-style environment loader but ships a Windows dropper that fires automatically on module load and on CLI invocation. Both dist/index.cjs (the package main) and dist/cli.cjs (the bin) contain an inlined routine dispatchAnalytics() invoked at top level. That routine reads dist/stest.jpg, extracts an encoded payload from the JPEG APP14 (0xED) segment, writes a self-deleting VBS wrapper to os.tmpdir(), and launches it via wscript.exe to run powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand, using detached and windowsHide to hide the console. The strings 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', and '-EncodedCommand' are reconstructed by joining split fragments to evade static analysis, and the executable content is smuggled inside a JPEG rather than appearing as a literal in source. Because the payload is opaque encoded PowerShell decoded at runtime from a bundled image, the eventual behavior on the installer's Windows host is fully attacker-controlled. Any require('secure-env3'), import 'secure-env3/config', or execution of the dot2env CLI on Windows triggers this hidden execution path.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (43eddaf152e2aa60b9f823513a2d9b11fc424a5cff4bb3c031f6823a48dc2f4e) package.json declares a postinstall hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that fires automatically on `npm install`. The shipped 4444.vbs contains a ~660-entry base64 string array (ArtifactBundleHX) that is reassembled and decrypted through layered AES-256-CBC and ChaCha20-IETF (keys derived via SHA-256) at install time, written to %TEMP% as a random `.dat` file, and passed to powershell.exe as a two-tier loader for in-memory execution / process hollowing. The VBS additionally obfuscates its Windows API surface: CreateObject targets such as `ADODB.Stream` and `Msxml2.DOMDocument` are stored as XOR-encoded colon-delimited integer arrays and decoded at runtime, and the AES S-boxes and SHA-256 round constants are XOR-masked. The package presents a `Device Telemetry Aggregator` / `Verdant Signals Corp` cover story in comments while package.json ships empty author and description fields. The combination of an auto-executed lifecycle script, multi-layer cryptographic unpacking of a hidden payload, in-memory PowerShell hand-off, and misleading self-labeling is arbitrary code execution on the installer's Windows host at install time.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f996c75c75423a57a64c1c89b04f2e1ba87674973dba2dd359df5b0937ffe3cf) The package is a dotenv typosquat that runs a hidden Windows loader on every require() and on CLI startup. dist/index.cjs and dist/cli.cjs invoke dispatchAnalytics() unconditionally at module top-level; that routine reads a bundled JPEG (dist/stest.jpg), parses its APP13 segment (marker 0xED) to extract a hidden UTF-8 payload, writes a self-deleting relay_[...].vbs into os.tmpdir(), and spawns wscript.exe detached with windowsHide:true to launch powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand carrying the extracted payload. Executable names and switches are assembled at runtime by joining split character arrays (['power','shell','.exe'].join(''), ['-No','Profile'], ['-Non','Interactive'], ['-Encoded','Command'], ['wscript','.exe']) to evade static string scanners, and the second-stage script is concealed inside the image rather than shipped as source. The tarball's internal identity does not match its advertised name: the bundled package.json inside dist/cli.cjs declares name:'node-env-buffer' version 2.2.6 while the outer package advertises better-dotenv3, indicating the same loader is being republished under multiple dotenv-lookalike names.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (eff7b9f53e0aed7a8a1c48ae92851ea0ed67b86566d208c78329ecb1b8a73173) src/index.js unconditionally invokes _bootstrap() from src/utils/bootstrap.js at module load time. bootstrap.js is heavily obfuscated with javascript-obfuscator (400-entry rotating string-array decoder, hex-escaped identifiers, self-defending wrapper, control-flow flattening) and imports the full download-and-execute primitive set: https.get/http.get, fs.createWriteStream, fs.mkdirSync, fs.chmodSync, fs.unlinkSync, os.tmpdir, and child_process.execFile/spawn. The destination URL, dropped filename, and executed argv are reconstructed at runtime from the obfuscated string array, so the network target and payload are concealed from static inspection. package.json declares javascript-obfuscator as a devDependency and defines an `obfuscate` build script, confirming the concealment is deliberate. The advertised purpose of the package is terminal string coloring / title setting, which does not require fetching or executing a binary at import time. Any consumer that imports chromatitle-js triggers the fetch-and-execute chain on the installer's machine.