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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-50168: @angular/platform-server · URL Parser Differential leading to SSRF Allowlist Bypass

Affects @angular/platform-serverSource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 22.0.0-rc.2 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.2High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 14% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 22.0.0-rc.2, 20.3.22, 19.2.23 +1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 15 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npm@angular/platform-serverAffected
  • >=22.0.0-next.0 <22.0.0-rc.2
Fixed in
  • 22.0.0-rc.2
npm@angular/platform-serverAffected
  • >=20.0.0-next.0 <20.3.22
Fixed in
  • 20.3.22
npm@angular/platform-serverAffected
  • >=19.0.0-next.0 <19.2.23
Fixed in
  • 19.2.23
npm@angular/platform-serverAffected
  • <=18.2.14
Fixed in–
npm@angular/platform-serverAffected
  • >=21.0.0-next.0 <21.2.15
Fixed in
  • 21.2.15

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Description

An issue in the `@angular/platform-server` package allows remote attackers to bypass host allowlist constraints and direct server-side outgoing requests to arbitrary external endpoints. This occurs due to a parser differential between the strict WHATWG URL parser used for allowlist validation and the lenient Domino URL parser used to initialize the server emulated DOM. When a server-side request contains a malformed URL with a double port structure (e.g., `http://evil.com:80:80/path`), Node's strict `URL.canParse(url)` logic returns `false` and skips host check validation entirely. However, the same malformed URL is later accepted and parsed leniently by Domino's internal parser, which resolves the origin to `http://evil.com:80`. The Angular SSR HTTP request interceptor (`relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`) then resolves all relative backend HTTP requests against this adopted origin, executing the SSRF attack. ### Impact Any Angular application utilizing server-side rendering (`@angular/platform-server`) that configures host routing allowlists (`allowedHosts`) is vulnerable to this allowlist bypass. By sending an HTTP request with a malformed Host header (e.g. `Host: evil.com:80:80`) or an absolute-form request URI, an attacker can bypass the allowlist logic completely (even when configured with a strict default deny setup). The SSR application will then route all relative `HttpClient` outgoing API queries—which commonly carry sensitive credentials, session cookies, and internal authorization tokens—to the attacker-controlled server instead of the intended backend services. Additionally, the attacker can supply custom payloads back to the emulated DOM, leading to response injection and content poisoning within the rendered HTML served to users. ### Attack Preconditions To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist: 1. **Active Server-Side Rendering (SSR):** The application must be configured to run with Angular Server-Side Rendering (`@angular/platform-server`). 2. **Host Header/URI Propagation:** The SSR handler must reconstruct the request URL using raw client inputs (such as request Host headers or absolute-form URIs) and pass it as `config.url` to the rendering API (`renderApplication` or `renderModule`). 3. **Outbound Relative HTTP Requests:** The server application must perform outbound backend API requests using relative paths (e.g., `this.http.get('/api/data')`) that undergo base-URL interceptor rewriting. 4. **Enabled Allowed Hosts Check:** The server must use the framework-provided `allowedHosts` options to limit valid server locations. ### Patches * 22.0.0-rc.2 * 21.2.15 * 20.3.22 * 19.2.23

References

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