Researchers uncovered a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the dYdX ecosystem by compromising legitimate packages on npm and PyPI repositories. The compromised npm package @dydxprotocol/v4-client-js (versions 3.4.1, 1.22.1, 1.15.2, 1.0.31) and PyPI package dydx-v4-client (version 1.1.5post1) were altered to include malicious code. The npm package payload functions as a cryptocurrency wallet stealer, extracting seed phrases and device information, critical for unauthorized access to users' crypto assets. The PyPI package includes both wallet stealing functionality and a remote access trojan (RAT) that activates immediately upon import, contacting a remote command-and-control server (dydx.priceoracle[.]site/py) to receive and execute arbitrary commands. The RAT uses stealth techniques such as the Windows CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag to avoid detection. The attack was likely enabled by the compromise of developer publishing credentials rather than exploiting registry vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the insertion of malicious code into core package files and heavy obfuscation in the Python payload. dYdX is a major decentralized exchange with over $1.5 trillion in cumulative trading volume, making it a high-value target. This attack follows a history of supply chain compromises involving dYdX, including npm account hijacking in 2022 and DNS hijacking in 2024, indicating persistent targeting by threat actors. The attack demonstrates advanced planning with coordinated cross-ecosystem deployment and consistent exfiltration infrastructure. The supply chain attack vector exploits the trust developers place in open-source package repositories, enabling widespread impact through a single compromised package update. Additionally, the broader ecosystem risk is highlighted by the presence of phantom npm packages that can be claimed by attackers to distribute malware via typosquatting or unregistered package names. This incident underscores the growing sophistication and danger of software supply chain attacks, particularly in the cryptocurrency and DeFi sectors.

European organizations involved in cryptocurrency trading, DeFi development, or blockchain infrastructure that utilize the compromised dYdX npm and PyPI packages face significant risks. The wallet stealer component threatens the confidentiality of users' seed phrases and private keys, potentially leading to irreversible financial losses through unauthorized asset transfers. The RAT component in the Python package enables persistent remote control over infected systems, risking further lateral movement, data exfiltration, and system manipulation. This can compromise the integrity and availability of critical development environments and infrastructure. Given dYdX's prominence in decentralized finance, organizations relying on these packages for transaction signing, order placement, or wallet management may experience operational disruption and reputational damage. The attack's stealthy nature and use of legitimate publishing credentials complicate detection and response. Furthermore, the incident highlights systemic supply chain risks that could affect a broad range of organizations beyond direct dYdX users, especially those integrating third-party open-source components. The financial sector's regulatory environment in Europe, emphasizing data protection and operational resilience, may impose additional compliance and reporting burdens following such incidents.

1. Immediately audit and isolate any systems that have installed the compromised package versions to prevent further spread or data exfiltration. 2. Migrate all cryptocurrency assets to new wallets generated on clean, uncompromised systems to prevent theft via stolen seed phrases. 3. Rotate all API keys, credentials, and secrets associated with dYdX integrations or related services. 4. Verify package integrity by cross-checking versions against official dYdX GitHub repositories and trusted sources before installation. 5. Implement strict supply chain security practices, including multi-factor authentication and credential hygiene for developer accounts with publishing rights. 6. Employ runtime monitoring and endpoint detection tools capable of identifying suspicious network connections, especially to known malicious domains like dydx.priceoracle[.]site. 7. Educate development teams on the risks of supply chain attacks and encourage the use of package signing and verification tools. 8. Consider using software composition analysis (SCA) tools to detect and block usage of compromised or suspicious package versions. 9. Register and monitor for typosquatting or phantom package names relevant to your ecosystem to prevent accidental installation of malicious packages. 10. Collaborate with upstream maintainers and report suspicious activity promptly to enable rapid response and patching.