CVE-2022-31021: hyperledger ursa · Untrusted Functionality Inclusion
Affects hyperledger ursaSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.3 Low · end of life, no fix coming : replace or isolate hyperledger ursa; no fix will be released.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 36% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- None coming – the product is end of life
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 16 Jan 2024
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.
What to do
No fix will be released: hyperledger ursa is end of life. Replace it, or isolate it from untrusted networks until you can.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
GitHubhyperledger/ursapkg:github/hyperledger/ursaOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
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AI-suggested
Given the absence of patches due to Ursa's end-of-life status, European organizations should consider the following specific mitigations: 1) Avoid using the affected versions (<=0.3.7) of Ursa in new deployments and migrate existing systems to alternative cryptographic libraries or frameworks that provide similar functionality with active support and security updates. 2) Implement strict controls and vetting processes for issuers within the blockchain ecosystem to prevent malicious actors from issuing credentials with weakened keys. 3) Employ additional privacy-preserving layers or protocols that do not solely rely on Ursa's unlinkability guarantees, such as zero-knowledge proofs or other cryptographic schemes with formal verification. 4) Monitor and audit credential issuance and verification processes to detect anomalies that could indicate attempts to exploit this vulnerability. 5) Engage with the broader Hyperledger and blockchain community to track any unofficial forks or patches addressing this issue. 6) Where possible, limit user interaction paths that could be exploited to trigger the vulnerability, and educate users about the risks of interacting with untrusted issuers.
Description
Ursa is a cryptographic library for use with blockchains. A weakness in the Hyperledger AnonCreds specification that is not mitigated in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations is that the Issuer does not publish a key correctness proof demonstrating that a generated private key is sufficient to meet the unlinkability guarantees of AnonCreds. The Ursa and AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations always generate a sufficient private key. A malicious issuer could in theory create a custom CL Signature implementation (derived from the Ursa or AnonCreds CL-Signatures implementations) that uses weakened private keys such that presentations from holders could be shared by verifiers to the issuer who could determine the holder to which the credential was issued. This vulnerability could impact holders of AnonCreds credentials implemented using the CL-signature scheme in the Ursa and AnonCreds implementations of CL Signatures. The ursa project has has moved to end-of-life status and no fix is expected.