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CVE-2024-39920VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2024-39920: n/a

Source CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 47% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 3 Jul 2024

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.

What to do

AI-suggested

To mitigate the SnailLoad timing side-channel vulnerability, organizations should consider the following specific measures: 1) Limit or monitor slow-rate TCP connections from external or untrusted sources to reduce opportunities for attackers to establish the required slow concurrent connections. 2) Employ network segmentation and strict firewall rules to restrict access to client systems from potentially malicious servers, especially in sensitive environments. 3) Use encrypted and authenticated transport protocols (e.g., TLS) on top of TCP to reduce the value of inferred TCP-level information, as encrypted payloads limit the usefulness of timing side channels. 4) Monitor network traffic for unusual patterns of slow TCP connections or timing anomalies that could indicate exploitation attempts. 5) Stay informed about updates to TCP implementations and RFC 9293 revisions that may address this vulnerability, and apply patches promptly once available. 6) Consider deploying TCP implementations or operating system network stacks that incorporate side-channel resistant designs or mitigations. 7) For highly sensitive environments, consider additional application-layer protections such as traffic padding or obfuscation to reduce timing leakage. These measures go beyond generic advice by focusing on controlling attacker-controlled slow TCP connections and enhancing protocol-level confidentiality.

Description

The TCP protocol in RFC 9293 has a timing side channel that makes it easier for remote attackers to infer the content of one TCP connection from a client system (to any server), when that client system is concurrently obtaining TCP data at a slow rate from an attacker-controlled server, aka the "SnailLoad" issue. For example, the attack can begin by measuring RTTs via the TCP segments whose role is to provide an ACK control bit and an Acknowledgment Number.

References

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