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CVE-2024-44730VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2024-44730: n/a

Source CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical.

Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 36% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 11 Oct 2024

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.

What to do

AI-suggested

Until an official patch is released, organizations should implement several practical mitigations: 1) Restrict access to Mirotalk instances to trusted networks or VPNs to reduce exposure to unauthenticated attackers. 2) Implement network-level controls such as firewall rules or WebRTC signaling restrictions to limit data channel connections to authenticated users. 3) Monitor chat logs and audit trails for unusual message patterns or sender anomalies that could indicate message forgery. 4) Consider deploying additional application-layer verification mechanisms, such as cryptographic message signing or sender identity validation, to detect and reject forged messages. 5) Educate users to be cautious about unexpected or suspicious chat messages, especially those requesting sensitive information or actions. 6) Follow Mirotalk project updates closely and apply patches immediately once available. 7) If feasible, isolate Mirotalk deployments from critical systems to minimize potential lateral movement or data leakage. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on network segmentation, monitoring, and layered verification to mitigate the risk in the absence of a patch.

Description

Incorrect access control in the function handleDataChannelChat(dataMessage) of Mirotalk before commit c21d58 allows attackers to forge chat messages using an arbitrary sender name.

References

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