CVE-2025-59406: Cleartext Transmission
Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.2 Medium.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 08:30 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 6% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Oct 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should first verify if they are using the affected version (6.21.11) of the Flock Safety Pisco Android application on their devices. Immediate steps include: 1) Requesting or applying an updated version of the application from the vendor that removes the embedded client secret and implements secure secret management practices, such as using backend token exchange mechanisms or secure vaults rather than embedding secrets in client code. 2) Rotating the compromised Auth0 client secret immediately to invalidate any extracted credentials and prevent unauthorized use. 3) Implementing network-level controls to restrict access to backend APIs only to trusted devices and IP addresses, adding an additional layer of defense. 4) Monitoring authentication logs for suspicious OAuth client activity that could indicate misuse of the leaked secret. 5) Employing runtime application self-protection (RASP) or application shielding techniques to make reverse engineering more difficult. 6) Conducting regular security audits and penetration tests focused on device firmware and application binaries to detect similar issues proactively. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on secret rotation, vendor coordination, and layered defense tailored to the affected device ecosystem.
Description
The Flock Safety Pisco com.flocksafety.android.pisco application 6.21.11 for Android (installed on Falcon and Sparrow License Plate Readers and Bravo Edge AI Compute Devices) has a cleartext Auth0 client secret in its codebase. Because application binaries can be trivially decompiled or inspected, attackers can recover this OAuth secret without special privileges. This secret is intended to remain confidential and should never be embedded directly in client-side software.
References
- gainsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Root-from-the-Coop-Device-3_-Root-Shell-on-Flock-Safetys-Bravo-Compute-Box-GainSec.pdf (opens in a new tab)
- flocksafety.com/products (opens in a new tab)
- flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers (opens in a new tab)
- gainsec.com/2025/09/27/fly-by-device-2-the-falcon-sparrow-gated-wireless-rce-camera-feed-dos-information-disclosure-and-more/ (opens in a new tab)