CVE-2025-59696: n/a
Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.2 Low · fixed in 13.6.12 : update affected systems when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 15% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 13.6.12
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Dec 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.
What to do
AI-suggested
1. Enforce strict physical security controls around Entrust nShield HSM devices, including locked server rooms, surveillance, and access logging to prevent unauthorized physical proximity. 2. Implement tamper detection monitoring and alerting to quickly identify suspicious events or missing logs. 3. Regularly audit tamper event logs and correlate with physical access records to detect anomalies. 4. 5. Consider deploying additional tamper-evident seals or external monitoring devices to complement the HSM’s internal tamper detection. 6. Limit administrative privileges on the chassis management board to trusted personnel only. 7. Review and update incident response plans to include scenarios involving tamper log manipulation. 8. For high-security environments, consider redundant or layered HSM deployments to reduce single points of failure.
Description
Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a physically proximate attacker to modify or erase tamper events via the Chassis management board.
References
- entrust.com/use-case/why-use-an-hsm (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-6q4x-m86j-gfwj (opens in a new tab)
- entrust.com/knowledgebase/hardware/understanding-nshield-security-advisory-september-2025 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-mgrh-gvcx-f62x (opens in a new tab)